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Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 47/81)

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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PAN-ARAB SUPPORT FOR LIBYA EXPRESSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 237, 28 Aug-3 Sep 81 p 17

[Editorial by Walid Abu Zahar: "Arabism Lies With Libya"]

[Text] The position taken by the Iraqi leadership on the American attack against the two Libyan planes represents another stage along the pan-Arab course. It is profitable to make a few observations about this position, although it is not a natural and expected extension of this course in the face of current issues.

An official Iraqi spokesman stated that Iraq, based on its established and fundamental pan-Arab positions, affirmed its support for Libya against the American attack to which the Libyan planes were subjected. He added that Baghdad always supports the Arab side, whatever its political hue, when it is subjected to foreign aggression.

The fact is that this position is not a new one but sanctions for the thousandth time a deeply rooted position held by the Iraqi leadership. This position can be summed up in a few words: Always on the Arab's side without the least hesitation or criticism in his struggle with the foreigner, whoever he may be.

Therefore, the position was expected, despite the fact that the incident itself was not devoid of a certain amount of showmanship, especially since observers' reports subsequently proved that Libyan officials did not believe for a moment that the American planes would oppose the Libyan planes. Aside from this, other information says that the Soviet Union wished to sound out Reagan through this manufactured incident to determine the seriousness of his recent warnings on different occasions and thus requested that the Libyans send their planes on an intercept mission over units of the American fleet in the Mediterranean.

And so what happened, happened.

We are not primarily concerned with the background of the incident, or its justifications, or the scenario employed by Qadhdhafi or Brezhnev in relation to it. Rather, we are more interested in shedding light on the various dimensions of the commanding pan-Arab position maintained by the leadership in Iraq with respect to the incident despite the fact that the Libyan regime is providing financial support and weapons to the Iranian regime which is killing Iraqi Arab

soldiers, as everyone knows. Perhaps someone may say that Colonel Qadhdhafi adopted a similar position when the Iraqi nuclear reactor came under attack. He contacted President Saddam Husayn and expressed his sorrow at the Israeli raid. He also dispatched 'Abd-al-Salam Jalud to Baghdad to confirm the pronouncement.

This observation may be appropriate, but it requires some additional comment. The Libyan regime generally says one thing and does the opposite. Drawing parallels is one thing, but actual practice is something else. Similarly, a show position based on a circumstantial reaction is one thing, but an established pan-Arab position that remains indivisible is quite another action. When Jalud arrived in Baghdad, he heard an important theory the gist of which is that the "pan-Arab conflicts" are an indivisible whole and it is impossible to separate the component parts of this whole. Just as it is impossible for you to be at one and the same time on my side against Israel and an ally of my enemy, the Iranian regime, it is unacceptable for you to declare in an elegantly worded statement your support for Iraq against the nuclear reactor strike at the same time that you secretly and openly resume weapons shipments to Tehran to strike at the land and people of Iraq.

This is a policy that is incompatible with the basic principles of the sound pan-Arab course. This course rejects "fragmentation" of positions on major issues and demonstrates the vast distance that separates the rostrum talks and resounding radio speeches, which are appropriate on any public occasion, and honorable pan-Arab practice, which views events from a comprehensive perspective that aims only at the greater Arab welfare apart from any disagreements--especially when there is a confrontation between Arab and foreigner.

On this basis, and based on the principles of pan-Arabism and the honor of defending them, we must stand with Libya in its confrontation with the foreigner--Libya of the people and Arabism.

So we have learned, and so we will remain.

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CSO: 4504/7

KABYLE QUESTION EXAMINED

London THE MAGHREB REVIEW in English Vol 5, Nos 5-6, Sep-Dec 1980 pp 115-124

[Article by Hugh Roberts, University of East Anglia: "Towards an Understanding of the Kabyle Question in Contemporary Algeria"]

[Text]

Introduction

For a number of reasons, it is particularly opportune to hold a seminar with the comprehensive title of 'Contemporary Maghreb' at the beginning of the 1980s. For one, it is useful to direct the spotlight to a region which is characterized by active processes of fermentation in the socio-political and cultural arenas. Both within and between the different countries of the region, moreover, there is political and military friction and even open conflict. At the same time, the Maghreb is struggling with the question of what its place ought to be within a broader pan-Arab and pan-Islamic perspective. Indeed simply recognizing and describing these tensions would be ample justification for organizing this gathering, in which people with different backgrounds and interests can present their views on problems and developments in the individual Maghreb states or in the region as a whole.

In my opinion, it may prove especially profitable to focus on the Maghreb since this region can serve both as an example and a testing ground for a large number of contemporary topics and theories in different disciplines. The purpose of our contribution, which is intentionally provocative, is to stress the nomothetic approach, and we believe that the spatial and functional unity in diversity —which is true of Maghreb—constitutes a fertile context in which to analyse various socio-economic and political processes. This belief, indeed, is inherent in the way human geographers tend to think. Positioned about half-way between abstract theorizing at the one extreme and spatial reality at the other, the geographer deliberately attempts to link these opposite ends by empirically verifying operatimalized theories and concepts.

The chief purpose of this paper is to advocate a specific way of looking at the Maghreb—a way in which one can combine elements of political and development

geography as they are being practised today in the Netherlands. In this approach, elements of theories on development are grafted on to the concept of the state, which forms the focal point for politico-geographical research.

To illustrate our approach, we will confine ourselves to only one of the Maghreb countries, namely Morocco, a choice based on the fact that we have several years of research experience in this country. Nevertheless, opportunities will be provided for making comparisons with the other Maghreb states, and our topic—the formation and functioning of the state of Morocco—offers points of contact not only with other topics relating to this country touched upon during this seminar, but also with similar processes in the other Maghreb countries.

The Scope of Political Geography[1]

Politics has never been the exclusive domain of any one particular group of people. Philosophers, jurists, historians, journalists and economists have continually put forward their respective claims and, more recently, political scientists have joined them as well. Geographers, too have long been interested in political phenomena. In this regard, Dutch political geographers are particularly concerned with (1) the processes of the integration and distintegration of political systems, (2) the relations that exist between political systems at the national level and those at the international level, and (3) the spatial aspects of the functioning of political systems at the intra-state level. This being the case, it is not surprising that the state has become the central focus of attention and the most fundamental theoretical concept in political geography.

The geographers' emphasis on the spatial influence on, and spatial effects of, the functioning of the state and its constituent parts allows for a classification consisting of four major fields of interest, each of which may be subdivided into smaller themes. These four major fields are:

1. State formation;
2. State functioning;
3. State control; and
4. External relations.[2]

This clearly indicates that there are numerous facets to the concept of state, but for the purpose of this paper we will limit ourselves deliberately to only a few aspects of state formation and the functioning of the state.

The choice of the state as the basic frame of reference and integration results from several considerations. First, during the period of decolonization many new states came into existence, although in this respect the term 'decolonization' is rather ambiguous. While this does not imply a return to pre-colonial political systems, neither does it mean that new political systems came into

existence. On the contrary, it was usually the state-idea introduced by Europeans which was adopted.

Clearly, most of the newly independent states of the African continent—including those of the Maghreb—are a legacy of the colonial past. As a consequence, the process of state formation is somewhat artificial in nature, and this artificiality is often cited as the cause of the 'awkward' location of international boundaries, the lack of internal stability and the friction which exists between neighbouring states (for example, between Morocco and Algeria, or between Tunisia and Libya). Such observations spring from an implied proposition, i.e. that the process of state formation in Europe itself was a 'natural' one. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth, and it is only because state formation in Europe began so long ago and took place so slowly that we tend to perceive the resulting states as natural entities.

In Europe, the process of nation-building generally followed—rather than preceded—the process of state formation, and the numerous ethnic minorities and separatist sentiments that can still be found in present-day Europe (Williams, 1980) serve as reminders of this process. It would seem, indeed, that in this respect the circum-Mediterranean countries have more in common with each other than they have differences.

However this may be, in a relatively short period of time there emerged frameworks for integration based on colonial (and in the case of the Maghreb partly also on pre-colonial) systems, which appear more stable than one might have presumed at first. Although the authority of the state may be weak within particular states or may even be largely juridical and theoretical in nature, there is no other institution that can supplant its role. It is therefore not surprising that the Organization of African Unity recognizes the African states as sovereign entities and accepts their boundaries as legitimate and inviolable. Even though the form may be of recent origin, and in many cases artificial, this does not mean that some other construct would be any less problematical, for the problems associated with the recent process of state formation are of a myriad nature.

Many young states, for example, face the problem of having to integrate their population into a single cohesive national unit, and expressions such as 'from tribe to nation' (Gellner and Micaud, 1972) or 'tribe and state' (Seddon, 1977) clearly reveal the crux of the problem. Kinship relations and the like must be replaced by a sense of nationhood which dominates public life and which mediates, or even regulates, when the interests of one group within the state clash with those of another group.

Elias (1974) introduces the concept of integration level, according to which it is possible to distinguish different levels of integration, all of which have their own spatial base, such as the national state, province,

district, etc. However, it is also possible to have integration levels which do not necessarily have to coincide with the spatial entities mentioned above. It is possible, for example, to have integration frameworks on the basis of functional criteria (modal regions), or others based on real or perceived common characteristics. 'Communities' are examples of such local integration levels. Elias further posits that the process of state formation involves integration at the higher level of the national state, which goes hand in hand with a relative loss of autonomy, for the lower levels lose functions and power and become dependent on the higher levels, where decisions are made and where the distribution of resources takes place. This loss of function, power, autonomy and identity, however, is often not accepted without resistance, and history provides many examples of this form of resistance, either on linguistic, religious or ethnic grounds against centralization at the state level.

Summarizing, one may conclude that focusing on the state as the frame of integration entails certain internal as well as external aspects. The internal aspects refer to to the formation of the state with all the problems associated with that, while the external aspects involve the recognition by other states of the sovereignty of the bounded space. This recognition, which constitutes a prerequisit, may itself present problems. As noted above, the former colonies have not only inherited—with more or less difficulty—their present form and style of government, but their ideological foundations as well. This includes both the ideal of the integrated nation-state, and that of the welfare state, and state and development have become synonymous. This, indeed entails the consideration of some ideas from development geography, which will be discussed in the following section.

Recent Ideas in Development Geography

In the mid-1960s new currents of thought appeared which were to challenge the so-called traditional theories of development, such as the economic–technological theory, or those of dualism, growth and modernization. This criticism came mainly from what we will call, for the sake of convenience, the 'dependencia' theorists and, during the protracted trench warfare that ensued a sustained theoretical bombardment exposed the weaknesses of the traditional theories.

The earlier overly monistic and a historical approaches were not considered adequate to offer an explanation for the problems of underdevelopment. The starting-point for the dependencia theorists is the consideration that causes of differences in the degree of economic development have to be sought in external and supra-national factors. Within this perspective, development is not the product of an independent impulse within a given economic structure, nor of the removal of social differences

within urban-industrial (capitalistic) societies. Neither does underdevelopment represent a lower stage to be traversed, following which a spontaneous process of growth can begin, and culminating in a 'modern' or 'developed' society.

Rather the circumstances of development and underdevelopment must be sought in a world economy of a capitalistic character. The central thesis of the dependencia theory is that developed countries grow autonomously, while the lesser developed ones show a growth-pattern that is a derivation from the latter, a deduction derived from the classical Marxist theory on imperialism, which is interwoven into the thinking on dependency. This is new, in so far as one seeks to attribute the tendencies in the development of dependent economies to the functioning of the world economy, and this emphasis on the effects which capitalistic expansion has on peripheral economies (the impact of external factors on internal conditions) indeed, forms the essential contribution in the discussion on developmental issues.

While this theory has proved its initial utility, there is a danger of stagnation in thinking, due to an over-emphasis on some (capitalistic) elements of the external aspects, combined with an under-estimation of internal effects. Indeed, the contradictions and dualistic phenomena within the less developed countries themselves have been pushed into the background, while the problem of development has been shifted to the level of the world economy, thereby ignoring the developments within individual states and often stressing the negative effects of external dependence.

Studies on individual dependence relations are also usually limited to the analysis of modes of production and their relations to social formations in general and to the penetration of capitalistic modes of production into large areas of the world. Vellinga (1979, p. 108), for example, notes an 'empirical anaemia' in these studies, whereby attention is limited to general economic problems on an aggregated level, the accumulation of capital, its distribution and use.

Recently one has witnessed gradual counter-attacks from different sources, in the form of criticism of the rather weak definitions, operationalization and verification found in the bulk of dependencia theory (Ettema, 1979a,b; Reitsma, 1980; Seddon, 1977; Wolters, 1979). This has led to a timid rapprochement between the formerly conflicting parties, and to a beginning of the onerous task of operationalization and testing and, perhaps, avowed empirists and zealous theoretists—if on speaking terms with each other—could form a workable combination and bring about a breakthrough in the actual deadlock.

No doubt we do have at the moment an impasse in research on development. One has lost his bearings and it is necessary to orientate oneself while, in the meantime,

discussions are going on about the direction to take. Obviously, the theoretical signs we thought of as valuable and reliable prove to point to nowhere or, at best, to a dead-end street. A good example of this confusion is a recent seminar held in Rabat, Morocco,[3] in which nearly all the Moroccans working in the field of development research as well as a considerable number of foreign experts, participated. The theme of the seminar was the dependence of Morocco and the question of transition. Elsewhere (De Mas, 1978, pp. 93–192) we have already noted that a large majority of the younger generation of Moroccan scholars exhibits a marked disposition towards dependencia theories. It is surprising, however, that those who stress the importance of all types of dependency as the explanatory concept for underdevelop ment, should themselves exhibit such a surprisingly dependent attitude by uncritically embracing such theories.

The overrall stagnation in Morocco and indeed considerable dependence on foreign capital and the world economy in general, are explained by 'dependencistas' only in terms of the dependence on foreign capital, loans, products and raw materials. The explanation, therefore, is put forward that the economic and military penetration of the European colonizing states, which had culminated in the French/Spanish protectorate, has continued even after the acquisition of political independence by Morocco.[4]

In brief, since the end of the eighteenth century Morocco has been integrated in the world economy, resulting in a dependent peripheral mode of production with the social formation inherent in that. So far so good. According to this theory, the economic and military penetration by France and Spain and the creation of two protectorates appear as events, setting in motion the modernization of traditional Morocco which, however, was to prove that the Marxist model of abrupt transition from traditional to modern society is hardly applicable to Morocco. At the end of the seminar, it was obvious that there was a theoretical standstill, 'blocage de la pense', and confusion as to the beginning, the end and the various stages of the transition. The general finding was that the actual ideas on dependence centre-periphery, change in the modes of production and social formations —including the functioning of the state—has little explanatory value when held against the light of the Moroccan experience. In this situation, where the future transition towards capitalism or socialism seems blocked as well, the confusion is substantial.

Fortunately, some people did propose a different direction and a few others have indeed already chosen that direction and turned their attention firmly to it. This paper is an invitation to those who find themselves confused to follow this direction. Perhaps one of Mao's less-quoted citations may serve as guidance in this

instance: 'If theory does not agree with reality, change the theory'.

New Approaches in Research on Morocco

We have pointed out in the above that a concentration on external factors has meant a decreased interest in the internal Moroccan context. This has two causes. The first is the understandable reaction to the preceding protectorate, expressed in terms of accusations for the condition of dependence it has brought about. The other factor has been the neglect of Morocco's pre-colonial history. Given the fact, as we said before, all new states have inherited the ideology of a united nation-state, and that the colonial historians deliberately stressed the differences along the urban–rural, Arab–Berber and Makhzen-Siba lines for the French and Spanish benefit, it is perhaps understandable that in the first years after independence Moroccans did not feel the need to concentrate on the internal aspects of their situation. This tendency to stress external factors became even greater in later years, because—which is indeed the second reason—attention to internal aspects would sooner or later have entailed an inevitable indictment of the *status quo* in Morocco.

But the time now seems right for a change. Recently, in analysing the structure, functioning and ideology of the Moroccan administration, we drew the conclusion that the present Moroccan state is a cumulative and negative result of a long process covering all the preceding periods of the sultanate, protectorate and the present monarchy. The arabesque intertwining the present and the past, external factors and the whole of religious, social and economic factors of internal order, have led us to the conclusion that a purely abstract approach which fails to take account of the historical and spatial context of Morocco has little explanatory value. Similar ideas have been expressed during the seminar held in Rabat and have been illustrated by a growing number of studies. It is not by chance that Guessous (a geographer himself) stated that 'we all suffer from excessive globalization and macroconcepts, while reality is heterogeneous in time and space'. He and Pascon stress rather the need for a concrete approach instead of unfruitful and sterile epistimologic quarrels and debates or a literal and ritual repetition of the classics.

Here, it is necessary to remark that regarding the often, but wrongly, quoted theory on imperialism, Lenin himself made clear that definitions and concepts are historically determined, and that therefore we need to observe concrete realities of the world economy in a given historical and contextual situation, thereby including specific time/space considerations (Arrighi, 1978, Chap. 1; Blusse *et al.*, 1980). There are signs, however, that a period of empirical groping in Morocco's historical dark has begun, and recent studies by El

Malki (1980), Ben Ali (1977, 1980), Boughassoul (1980) and Pascon exemplify this new approach.[5]

Having said this we hasten, ourselves, to declare that a historical approach alone is also not sufficient. If this were the case, the often excellent descriptive works from the colonial period could already be considered adequate. In our opinion, however, two further aspects should be added; a new theoretical framework and the spatial element. As far as the new historical approach is concerned, there is a clear tendency in Morocco to condemn the colonial historians (Ayache, 1979a; Morsy, 1979), especially their view concerning the role of the state and aspects connected to the Makhzen-Siba relations. The danger is apparent that, simply as a reaction to the colonial points of view on that matter, one can take diametrically opposed standpoints. Ayache states, for instance, that there was indeed a Moroccan nation and that the Siba (including the Rif) did not mean a complete rupture with the Makhzen, but had more the character of peripheral integration, aspects of which we shall return to later.

The issue at stake here is whether or not this historical approach is subject to the same flaws we mentioned in regard to research on development in general: being overly global and empirically weak. In our opinion, this historical revival is related to the growing interest in one's own Berber/Moroccan culture, after that had been slighted for so many years, a revival that by the looks of it cannot be detached from recent pan-Islamic developments. However, it is to be hoped that this significant self-discovery does not lead to mere introspection and a defensive attitude to all foreign influences. Indeed, Moroccan and, more recently, Iranian history offer examples of curious coalitions between traditional elements and ultra-progressive and nationalistic forces against perceived external dangers, whether of religious, economic or military nature, and recent events in Fes should be seen in this perspective.[6]

Historically oriented research therefore, should be of a clear theoretical and thoroughly empirical conception. As an example of such an approach one can cite the work of Seddon (1979) describing the complex process of articulation between (European) capitalist and (Maghreb) pre-capitalist modes of production. In it, he clearly demonstrates, on the basis of the differences between Morocco and Algeria, that the attempt to characterize the particular social formation of the whole Maghreb, or even that in the different countries, with one single mode of production is bound to be unfruitful and inadequate. He argues that the history of the transformation of the Moroccan and Maghrebian political economy can be conceptualized as taking place at several different levels and in a number of distinctive modes of production, stressing that 'beyond this general rule [Marxist 'law of motion'—PDM] lies the need for an

investigation, in each instance, of the specificity of the articulation in a series of conjectures to identify the determinants of the individual history of a particular social formation' (Sneddon, p. 37).

We agree with this point of view concerning future empirical research and, as we said earlier, it is the first step on a long and winding road, paved with many contributions from different disciplines and at different spatial and analytical levels. A great number of issues, research fields, as well as current and past research, fit surprisingly in this framework, among which one can mention the formation and functioning of the pre-colonial state and its internal and external relations; the relations between rural and urban, between Makhzen and Siba and the different social classes and categories. Even the external relations between the sultanate of Morocco and the outside world in their broadest meanings have to be taken into account. This necessitates a massive number of new studies, but also a re-interpretation of the abundant literature and material inherited from the colonial era.

Our own contribution limits itself to the political-geographic aspects of the formation and functioning of the Moroccan state and related developmental topics, as indicated before, and in doing so we hope to add two elements to Seddon's approach.

Firstly, and a direct result of our stated interest in the concept of state, we have the conviction that research on peripheral regions should not limit itself to external economic relations, but should also include attention to the way in which a region is integrated into a state.[7] Therefore, we have concentrated on the Rif, which according to Galtung's (1971, p. 84) theory could be considered part of 'the periphery of the periphery'. The history of the Rif shows how wrong it is to consider this a given and timeless situation. First of all, what is peripheral and who, what and where is the centre? These questions touch on the supposedly timeless Siba/Makhzen stereotype, as well as on the position of Morocco as periphery.

The history of Morocco and the Rif shows how difficult it is to generalize about Galtung's theory in a situation where both the centre itself (divided into centre and periphery) and the periphery itself (also with its own core and margins) change constantly. Braudel (1979, II), for example, presents an historical process, whereby core and dependent region change constantly because of the rise and fall of important cities acting as centres. Recent discussion revolves around whether or not the Rif can be considered peripheral and, if so, whether this has always been the case. Ayache, for one, claims that this was not the case during the sultanate, but that it became peripheral because of European penetration and the consequent protectorates. Seddon (1974, p. 156), on the contrary, maintains that it was not

peripheral during the sultanate, and not even during the protectorate (because it was integrated completely into the Spanish colonial economy and the Spanish colonial political and administrative system), but became peripheral when integrated into the more developed sectors of the southern zone in the post-colonial economy and newly formed state of Morocco. Heinemeijer and De Mas (1980) leave the question open regarding the pre-colonial period, because of the contradictory nature of the evidence presented so far,[8] but they do declare that although the conditions for regional secession were present in two peripheral regions, the Rif and the Sous, this in fact never happened. Though the scars of the past may still be seen in the present state of Morocco, the state will not break up along the former lines of division. However, ample evidence is available to suggest that the political and economic integration of the southern periphery (the Sous) is far more progressed than that of the northern periphery.

Even concentrating on the relation between one specific part of the Moroccan periphery and the centre indicates the need for detailed regional historical research to supply the general body of theory with hard empirical evidence. Studies on other Moroccan regions like those on the Haouz (Pascon, 1977), Seksawa (Berque, 1978) and the Eastern frontier (Dunn, 1977) prove this convincingly.

The second point we wish to add is that of the need to study the manner in which the process of integration and functioning of the Rif took place under the Spanish protectorate and is taking place today in the independent Moroccan state. We have already claimed that there is a continuity from protectorate to the present state, and from the point of view of the Riffians one could perhaps look upon both forms of integration as being quite similar. The reaction to the Spanish penetration was ambiguous, ranging from outright violent resistance (1921–1926, Mohammed Ben Abd-el Krim) to an open league with the enemy, often by one and the same persons or group of persons.[9] The reaction to the perceived 'internal colonization' (a term introduced by Hechter, 1975) by the new Makhzen in 1956 was similar. It is becoming more and more clear also that, on a national scale, the same ambiguity existed as resistance and the protégé system both marked the period of European penetration and the ensuing protectorate. It is striking, that an exact duplicate of the protégé system, in which influential Muslim and Jewish Moroccan families played important roles, is found in the coastal areas of the Rif, as well as in the High Atlas and the Oriental plains (Brown, 1976, 1979; Schaar, 1966; Bowie, 1970; Dunn, 1977).

By means of research on this paradox of resistance and cooperation, as well as of the whole problem of the traditional and modern economic penetration and domin-

ance and the traditional and modern 'protégé' belonging to it, too much emphasis is laid on structural analysis of the so called 'elite', 'bourgeoisie' or 'comparadore bourgeoisie'. This is a result of the classical theory whereby society is presented as a class model and where the state is perceived as an instrument of the 'ruling class'. The problem is that it is difficult to delineate the exact relation between society and state, or even to provide adequate operational definitions of these two concepts. Furthermore, the formation or disintegration of states on the one hand, and that of classes on the other, are only partly inter-connected, both having their own dynamics (Wolters, pp. 198–201).

This structural approach to Moroccan classes in the past and present hampers considerably current research on social formations and the structuring and functioning of the state administration. Social classes and institutions are too schematic, rigid and simplified analytical tools to tackle Moroccan society and state. They leave out of consideration the highly personal and flexible patterns of patronage and clientele, existing alongside and often within or opposed to the institutions and structures belonging to the realm of the state and to different social and economical sectors. We have mentioned that these institutions and structure may be comparable, at first glance, to those we know in the Western world (in fact mostly inherited from it), but their working is quite different and can only be fully understood by superimposing the patronage and clientele structure upon them.

Ample evidence is given for Morocco (De Mas, 1980) to prove Boissevain's (1971) thesis that procedures and institutions which operate well in certain systems cannot always be implemented in other contexts in which different structures operate. If this implementation is done, procedures and institutions may lead to conditions in which scarce resources are misused for sectional or personal interests. The phenomenon of patronage forms the really crucial, if unacknowledged, political and social reality behind the nominal constitutional and social facade. This is certainly the case in Morocco, other Mediterranean countries and, to a lesser degree, also in countries elsewhere in the world (Gellner and Waterbury, 1977).

We therefore strongly plead for the incorporation of this aspect into research on the Maghreb, especially in regard to the role it plays in hampering or obstructing the functioning of the state and its institutions, the process of integration, and so on. Furthermore, it should be established to what degree the networks of patronage and clientele coincide with ethnic and/or racial contradistinctions.

Suggested Approaches to Research on the Maghreb

It will by now be clear that the 'contemporary

Maghreb' cannot be understood properly without the kind of empirical research presented above for the specific Moroccan situation, the only difference being that the scale of the research is considerably greater, offering at the same time greater possibilities for comparative, longitudinal studies. In our introduction we have already pointed out that the uniqueness of the Maghreb as a research field lies in the fact that phenomena and processes do not occur there in the same way or with the same intensity as elsewhere, but still do so with such regularity that it is useful to study them. The diversity in homogeneity is the surplus value we ascribe to the Maghreb and it is this characteristic which makes this area pre-eminently suited for testing various aspects of political-geographical and development geography we think relevant.

There are already a substantial number of detailed studies on practically every domain for the different Maghreb countries. Unfortunately, this research tends to follow a more ideographic (singularizing/descriptive), than a nomothetic (generalizing/explanatory) approach. While both approaches have description as well as explanation as their goal, the propositions in the ideographic approach are about limited and contiguous time/space regions, whereas the propositions in the nomothetic approach deal with phenomena that (at least in principle) can be found over a wide field of non-contiguous space/time regions (see figure below).



(Galtung, pp. 23–24)

The relation between nomothetic, ideographic, synchronic and diachronic approaches.

Thus, the propositi- s in the ideographic approach are programmatically limited to a contiguous region (usually one interval in the history of one nation or region, or of some selected aspects of it), whereas the proposition in the nomothetic approach know no such boundaries. Obviously, the borderlines between the two approaches are by no means sharp, and as is usual with dichotomies, they have a tendency to polarize not only thinking but also people.

This is particularly important in connection with the other disputed relationship between the *synchronic* approach (dealing with phenomena that take place

anywhere in space, but within a relatively narrow time interval) and the *diachronic* approach (dealing with phenomena that take place anywhere in time but within a limited space region) (see Galtung (1967, p. 24) claims that: 'What is missing would be ideographic, synchronic science: the really good set of treatises about a given region in space ... Correspondingly, the total set of historical and much socio-economic work may fill both time and space by joining works about adjacent and contiguous space/regions. What is missing here would be nomothetic, diachronic science connecting all this knowledge in theoretical frameworks that know no limitations in space and time, operating at the level of individuals and of social structure.'

He stresses the need to tear down the artificial barriers between the four approaches mentioned above, by an approach which, theoretically, explores relations both in time and space, in contiguous and non-contiguous regions at the explanatory and descriptive levels. This means that keeping, for instance, a spatial unit (e.g. a state) constant would yield a diachronic analysis, while keeping time constant would yield a synchronic analysis. Giving both dimensions of time and space free play, would give a kind of analysis (nomothetic variety) towards which research should be directed. In connection with this, the whole Maghreb should be considered divided into a multitude of time/space units (not necessarily corresponding to states or other administrative units) according to a division into the respective time and space dimensions. The way a researcher studies the Maghreb as a contiguous space/time region would depend on the problem definitions of the respective disciplines.

In this paper we have indicated various fields of interest in political geography and development geography. We hope that during the seminar more topics will be touched which could be integrated into the above-mentioned approach to the study of the Maghreb which, due to its distinctiveness and variety, forms an excellent area of study.

NOTES

[1] This paper is based on the conceptual work of Van Amersfoort and Van der Wusten, both senior lecturers in geography, University of Amsterdam, and editors of a forthcoming introduction to political geography.

[2] These four major fields form the content of the publication mentioned above.

[3] Colloque 'Dépendance et problématique de la transition', 10–12 April 1980, Faculté des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Sociales, Université Mohammed V, Rabat.

[4] See Oualalou's article in *Al-Machra*, No. 1, where he divides the process of penetration into three periods: 1850–1912, 1912–1955, and after 1956, thereby leaving the period before 1850 aside.

[5] Seminar in Rabat. Benali on the role of the Fassi-commercial elite after 1850 and Boughassoul on changes in modes of production in the Maghreb from 1830 till 1930.

[6] Clashes between the police and so-called 'intégristes musulmans' in the religious capital of Morocco. Already in the 1930s the resistance against the French protectorate was a coalition

between traditional religious elements and younger, modern educated nationalists (El Kohen, 1977a, b). For the revival of interest in the Moroccan cultural patrimony, see *Lamalif*, No. 115; *Al-Asas*, No. 19 and especially Amazigh, *Revue Marocaine d'histoire et de civilisation*, No. 1, 1980.

[7] Ettema (1980) claims that the interaction between 'endogenic' characteristics and external integration decides the outcome of the process of peripheralization. 'It is the process of peripheralization which must be studied in its actual and its historical dimensions' (p. 144).

[8] Pascon will publish an historical case-study on the valley of Beni Boufrah (province of Al Hoceima) in a forthcoming French publication of the REDRA project; a research project of the Departments of Geography, University of Amsterdam and L'Institut Agronomique et Véterinaire Hassan II in Rabat.

[9] Ibid., Pascon.

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CSO: 4500/70

ALGERIA

CONTENT, POTENTIALITY OF HOUSEHOLD CENSUS DATA

London THE MAGHREB REVIEW in English Vol 6, Nos 3-4, May-Aug 1981 pp 45-48

[Article by Keith Sutton: "Household Census Data From Algeria: Its Content and Potentiality"]

[Text]

Abstract

The 1977 Population Census of Algeria offers researchers a rather unique collection of data because the results are available at the levels of each household and individual. Thus, the researcher can make a precise study of a single village or of an urban quarter, or he can extract large samples without the problems of generalization which result from the use of data aggregated to the level of communes or *arrondissements*. The range of information available from the Algerian census is described and demonstrated for two villages, a *centre de regroupement* and an agrarian reform village. The object is to show the possibilities offered by these census documents for Third World studies.

The analysis of spatial and social patterns as revealed by population census data is invariably hindered by the aggregated nature of data supplied by census authorities who are anxious or required to maintain a degree of confidentiality about individuals and households. Whereas much sophisticated statistical analysis of census data by tracts or communes is possible, the researcher remains one short but tantalizing step removed from his subject matter.[1] Sample questionnaire surveys are possible but these pose organizational problems linked to the time and money available for field work and often suffer from inadequate response rates which can bias the results. These data problems were obstacles for the author enquiring into the 1980s situation of regrouped settlement centres established in Algeria by the French army, 1957-1961. Over 2,300 of these *centres de regroupement* existed by 1961 and contained upwards of 2,350,000 people, or one in three of the rural population.[2] Much evidence existed that many of these supposedly temporary centres remained in existence during the 1960s and were evolving into permanent additions to the Algerian rural

settlement system.[3] However, published census data for 1966, and those planned for 1977, were at the geographical scale of the commune, too large an areal unit for studies of the populations of individual rural settlements. A partial solution was to use some 1973 preparatory census documentation, the *Enquête découpage districts 1973*, which allowed localities to be identified and a rough estimate of their size to be made from the numbers of occupied dwellings listed as a guide for the later use of the census enumerator.[4] Some functional characteristics of the surviving *centres de regroupement* could also be ascertained from this 1973 data source.

On the basis of personal assurances from census officials that the results of the 1977 census would ultimately be available to researchers at the very basic scale of each household and each individual, a brief reconnaissance exercise was undertaken at the *Centre National de Dépouillement* of the *Commissariat National aux Recensements et Enquêtes Statistiques* (C.N.R.E.S.) in Oran.[5] Samples were sought from the completed household census forms (*feuilles de ménage*) for two villages for 1977, the *centre de regroupement* of Djebabra and the agrarian reform village of Aurès el Meida. A further sample from the 1966 census was obtained for Djebabra. The census officials in Oran were most cooperative in providing the files of household census forms as requested, and it was an exhilarating experience handling data which in Britain and elsewhere would remain confidential under the 100-year rule or similar restrictions on access. In view of this quite different attitude on the part of the Algerian census authorities towards the confidential nature of household level census data, it is proposed to illustrate the nature of the information contained in the hope that others working on Maghreb and Third World problems may perceive the potential of this data source for analytical work at a scale rarely possible without considerable field work.

The Contents of the 1977 Census Form

The basic *feuille de ménage*, or household form, amounts to a large single sheet folded into four pages, the last of which is an Arabic translation of the questions, which together with instructions to the enumerator, are in French. All the manuscript responses in the samples taken were also in French. After details of the address, geographical code, date, and the names of the enumerator and controller, the census form is divided into sections on the construction, the dwelling and household, and the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of each individual. Construction questions ascertain whether the building pre- or post-dates 1966, the type of building, the state of repair, the number of storeys, and the nature of the walls and roof.

The second section, entitled *Logement et Ménage*, ranges widely enquiring after the following:

whether the dwelling is inhabited and whether it has a non-residential function
an interior courtyard, independent or communal
a kitchen and a bathroom in the building

the number of rooms and those used for dwelling purposes
whether there is an inside or outside toilet and the type thereof
the water source: piped, well, spring, etc.
electricity and gas supply, and whether piped or bottle gas
the ownership of the building: local authority, private, etc.
whether the household rents or owns the dwelling or whether it is accommodated there free of charge
whether the household receives any money from relatives dwelling elsewhere in Algeria or abroad, or from state or other pensions.

Finally, the membership of the household is divided into four categories: residents present; residents absent for less than six months; emigrants abroad; and visitors having stayed for less than six months.

The third section gives the following details for each individual member of the household, with several questions obviously not being answered on behalf of children:

name, sex, and relationship to the head or other member of the household
date of birth or, if a birth certificate is not possessed, the year of birth
the place of birth. The commune only is asked for, with a request *not* to add the *douar* or district
matrimonial situation, including separated and divorced
the place of residence of absentees and visitors
the place of residence in April 1966, the date of the previous census
year when each individual moved into the commune. Obviously many had lived there from birth
previous place of residence
nationality
the education section covered languages which could be read and written, the final class attended at school or college, and the highest academic diploma achieved
the economic situation encompassed those in work, out of work, studying, housewife, retired, invalid, and an 'other non-active' category which would include children not in education
for those unemployed, data were sought on their previous job and on the length of time without work
the kind of employment. A precise job description was asked of each individual as well as a crude indication of whether skilled or not

further employment details covered the situation, i.e. employer, cooperator, permanent or seasonal employee, apprentice, etc., and the length of time in the present job

for the place of work of each individual, data were sought on its main economic activity, its location by commune or urban district, and its sector, i.e. administration, public, autogestion, cooperative, or private.

A similar range of socio-economic data had been sought in the 1966 census, although slightly less detailed, and the previous residence information was restricted to place of residence on 1 July 1962, that is on Independence Day, rather than at birth and at the time of the previous census.

Case Studies: Djebabra and Aurès el Meida in 1977

To illustrate the nature of the information afforded by the *feuilles de ménage*, two constrasting case studies are briefly discussed. The village of Djebabra[6] originated in the late 1950s as a *centre de regroupement* created by the French army as part of its anti-guerrilla strategy. Aurès el Meida is also an artificial creation as one of the first agrarian reform villages which have, since 1973–1974, formed part of the *Révolution Agraire* programme. On the basis of a 25 per cent sample Djebabra has about 140 households which contain about 628 people. From a 33 per cent sample Aurès el Meida contains about 150 households with about 969 people.[7] The non-residential buildings in Djebabra numbered eight, encompassing seven functions; those in Aurès el Meida numbered eight, as did the functions. So, the two villages are similar in size, with the agrarian reform village having a higher average density per house. Being a new settlement, all houses in Aurès el Meida had a piped water supply, electricity, and bottle gas. By constrast, all houses in Djebabra obtained their water from a spring, only half had electricity, while practically all used bottle gas. Average family size was slightly larger in Aurès el Meida (4·75 persons compared with 4·49), while its balanced sex ratio contrasted with Djebabra's higher proportion of females (54 per cent). Households, and often families, of ten or more were not uncommon in both settlements. Juvenility is stronger in Djebabra, with 57·4 per cent below 21 years of age, 31·8 per cent aged 21–50, and 10·8 per cent aged 51 or more. Given its agrarian reform origins, Aurès el Meida enjoys a higher proportion of people in the active age groups, 34·5 per cent aged 21–50, compared with 52·2 per cent below 21, and 13·3 per cent above 50.

In view of the recent and artificial origins of both settlements, data on the migration history of their populations are especially interesting. Of Djebabra's population aged 11 and over, 95·7 per cent were residing

in the same commune in 1966. Aurès el Meida obviously did not exist in 1966, but 84·0 per cent of its population were living in the same commune then. Of the thirty-four individuals elsewhere in 1966, eight were in the same *wilaya* of Sidi Bel Abbès, thirteen in the adjacent *wilaya* of Saïda to the south, and three in that of Oran to the north. The question about the year people settled in the present commune of residence revealed that 86·0 per cent in Djebabra and 55·7 per cent in Aurès el Meida had lived locally since birth. Of the 113 in-migrants recorded in the Aurès el Meida sample, two peak periods are detectable, 1964–1966 and 1975, but the sample is too small to read much into this. For the in-migrants, data on their previous place of residence suggested a predominance of short-distance movement. The adjacent two communes to the north of Djebabra, Meurad and Hadjout, accounted for most of its in-migrants, while 68·6 per cent of those who had moved to Aurès el Meida came from the same *wilaya* of Sidi Bel Abbès, though 26·3 per cent had moved northwards from the steppe *wilaya* of Saïda. Several young children and babies were listed as in-migrants, though not their mothers, suggesting that a temporary move to a maternity hospital or to relatives for the birth was being recorded, so affecting the census results. Spatially, the in-migration data for Aurès el Meida showed concentrations within Sidi Bel Abbès *wilaya*, particularly to the south from the communes of Oued Berkeches and Sidi Ali Boussidi, and to the south-west, from those of AIn-Temouchent and AIn Kihal.

The last section of the census form supplies data on employment and economic activity. In both villages low activity rates emerge: 15·3 per cent of the population in Djebabra, and 19·5 per cent in Aurès el Meida. A further 7·1 per cent were unemployed in Aurès el Meida, and in both places the numbers of schoolchildren equalled or exceeded the employed total. No one regarded themselves as 'retired', despite some elderly men being included in the sample. Women were invariably recorded as 'housewives'. Occupations were dominated by agricultural labourers, vineyard workers, and tractor drivers. The narrow range of occupations in the *centre de regroupement* contrasted with the wider range displayed by the larger sample from Aurès el Meida, which included teachers, social workers, and other service sector workers. Likewise, contrasts emerged in job situation in that the largest group of workers in Aurès el Meida were co-operators, the product of the agrarian reform, whereas seasonal workers were marginally more important than permanent employees in Djebabra. Place of work data revealed only one commuter in Djebabra and two in Aurès el Meida plus a few individuals working and living away from home elsewhere in Algeria and in France. Both villages were thus, as expected, self-contained agricultural settlements.

For Djebabra a 25 per cent sample was also taken from the 1966 *feuilles de ménage* to allow some comparisons. The 130 households containing 589 people were only slightly fewer than in 1977. All the 1966 sample were living in the same commune in 1962. Compared with 1977, a higher proportion of people were working, over half of them in viticulture, a branch of agriculture which had disappeared from Djebabra by 1977. With this change, the dominance of the *autogestion* sector had also disappeared, 1966–1977.

The Potentiality of the Data for Third World Studies

Although the previous section presented a few detailed aspects for just two villages, it is hoped that this has demonstrated the wider research potentiality of the data source. The micro-scale at which the Algerian population can be sampled and studied should be re-emphasized. Individual villages, hamlets, and dispersed dwellings can be isolated for study, as can blocks, streets and individual constructions in urban localities. Both detailed local studies and wider sample studies can be made using this census documentation. These can use individual or household level information and so avoid having to infer relationships from generalized data at various aggregated levels from communes upwards. For example, hypotheses of relationships between the educational level of individuals and their socio-economic status can be tested, and the social and spatial details of the large but poorly documented unemployed sector of the population can be studied, without being blunted by the use of aggregated data. Population migration in particular can be examined through three items of information contained in the census: firstly, an individual's place of birth; secondly, his residence in 1966; and thirdly, his place of residence prior to his present address. Many migrant paths would be amply covered by these three items, and samples of the populations of shanty-towns, inner city slums, or agrarian reform villages would yield interesting results. Evidence, put forward by Mutin,[8] of the continued occupation of accommodation on *autogestion* estates by former workers who have moved on to urban industrial jobs, could be substantiated, though some such illegal occupants may well have evaded the census or, at least, some of its questions. The details of housing conditions and of services, could be ascertained for areal samples of urban slums or rural *centres de regroupement*, samples which would require a major organizational effort in terms of questionnaire surveys in the field. Further, the availability of the 1966 census, with a similar range of questions, allows the time dimension to be added.

In short, the quite different attitude taken by the Algerian authorities towards the secrecy of census data allows researchers to investigate problems at whatever scale of aggregation is appropriate, rather than to make do with more generalized data sets. Regional and

national samples can be employed which would be quite impracticable on the basis of personal or even team field work. It is to be hoped that Algeria's example is followed by other Third World census authorities and so encourages the maximum use of the immense and valuable collections of data embodied in their national censuses.

NOTES

[1] I. M. L. Robertson, 'The census and research: ideals and realities', *Institute of British Geographers, Transactions*, Vol. 48, 1969, 173–187.

[2] M. Cornaton, *Les regroupements de la décolonisation en Algérie*, (Les Editions Ouvrières, Paris, 1967), pp. 122–123.

[3] K. Sutton and R. I. Lawless, 'Population regrouping in Algeria—traumatic change and the rural settlement pattern', *Institute of British Geographers, Transactions*, New Series, Vol. 3, 3, 1978, 331–350.

[4] K. Sutton, 'A note on the use of preparatory census documentation in the study of rural settlement in Algeria, *Peuples Méditerranéens* (*Mediterranean Peoples*), Vol. 5, 1978, 137–146.

[5] The author wishes to record his thanks to M. Bouisri and his staff at the Centre National de Dépouillement of the C.N.R.E.S. Its address is: 16, rue Aspirant Maoued Ahmed (ex-rue Mirauchaux), Oran.

[6] Djebabra lies in the commune of Bou Medfa, in the *daïra* of Miliana, in the *wilaya* of El Asnam. Aurès el Meida is situated in the commune and *daïra* of Hammam Bou Hadjar, in the *wilaya* of Sidi Bel Abbès.

[7] The validity of these samples is confirmed by a precise figure of 638 inhabitants for Djebabra given in the *Tableau Recapitulatif Communal* which is a document summarizing the numbers of households and individuals in each settlement or census tract in the commune. A 1979 newspaper report on Aurès el Meida noted that it contained 150 dwellings and slightly more than 1,000 inhabitants (*El Moudjahid*, 5 April 1979).

[8] G. Mutin, 'Développement et maîtrise de l'espace en Mitidja', *Revue de Géographie de Lyon*, Vol. 52, No. 1, 1977, 6–33.

CSO: 4500/70

ALGERIA

AGREEMENTS IN ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL AREAS SIGNED WITH SOVIETS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2746

[Text] The seventh meeting of the Algerian-Soviet commission on economic, scientific and cultural cooperation, at the vice-presidential level, held in Moscow, ended 20 October. The two sides at that time signed several documents elaborating new areas of Algerian-Soviet cooperation and initialed a protocol that will serve as a basis for the work of the seventh meeting at the ministerial level, to be held in November in Algiers.

Various documents approved at this preparatory session show the intention of both sides to deepen cooperation by taking account of the priorities established by Alberia's fifth 5-year economic development plan. The Algerians and Soviets agreed to work jointly to carry out a major hydraulics and land improvement program, involving four big dams, and examined the possibility of joint participation in building a series of other dams in Algeria.

In the industrial sector, the two sides agreed, among other things, to construct a spare parts workshop at El Hadjar, a 500,000-ton cement works at Djelfa, to expand the plate-glass unit at Oran, and examined the possibility of increasing the current level of cooperation in the metal industries, mining and construction materials sector.

In the field of vocational training and national cadres, the two delegations decided on the modalities of construction of 20 vocational training centers and announced the decision to build 40 others together. Still on the subject of training, several advanced institutes will be established in Algeria as part of the Algerian-Soviet cooperation agreements.

The experts on the two delegations also examined the possibility of cooperation in the field of housing, railroad infrastructure and transfer of skills and technology, and in a general way means of expanding cooperation between the two countries.

9516
CSO: 4519/41

ALGERIA

OFFICIAL SAYS NO PLANS TO REGAIN COUNTRY'S ARCHIVES FROM FRANCE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1878, 6 Nov 81 p 2811

/Text/ At a press conference which he gave on 29 October, Raymond Courriere, secretary of state responsible foe former residents of Algeria, said that there are no plans for an immediate transfer of the Algerian archives. The French secretary of state said: "If anybody thinks that tomorrow we are going to ship out the 400 tons of Algerian archives. I can tell you that they are mistaken. I know that our repatriates are worried over this matter which was raised by the Algerian Government 20 years ago but I do not want it to overshadow our efforts of the last 5 months to improve and finally settle the situation of the repatriates."

The problem of these archives is a case where "you cannot see the wood for the trees," Courriere reckons and he expressed his surprise to see it being raised "just when the government is working to improve the conditions of the former residents of Algeria." "Everybody knows that since 1962 the Algerian Government has been calling for the return of the archives kept by France and covering the colonial period from beginning to end, but we are not prepared to let anybody down," Courriere said, pointing out that the Algerians, "as a matter of fact, had never asked for all the archives, I think that it is normal for the French Government to defend its interests and for the Algerian Government to do the same," he added. Courriere explained that the Secretariat for Former Residents of Algeria had taken part in the discussion which are in progress between Paris and Algiers. "The problem of the archives," he said, "is one of the items under discussion."

It is also reported that some 30 associations of French residents in North Africa have asked the government to abandon the idea of turning over to Algeria the archives, now being kept in Aix-en-Provence, covering the period of colonial rule in that country. According to a communique published by the "Algerian Circle," those associations have decided "to remain vigilant and to jointly take all the necessary measures" to prevent any future transfer to Algeria of the archives brought from that country to France in 1962.

On 20 October, the Overseas Academy of Sciences already spoke against the possibility of France handing over to Algeria the archives of the former Governor General Administration of Algiers. In a resolution, the Academy stated that the archives "belong to the French nation, they are sovereign archives which cannot be turned over to a foreign government," and added that "premature disclosure" of the political archives could rake up past events which fell under the statute of limitations but only in France.

The Overseas Academy of Sciences has proposed that Algerian historians be given access to the overseas archives kept in Aix-en-Provence and it has put forward the idea of creating a French-Algerian Joint Commission entrusted with the task of reproducing in microfilm documents which do not jeopardize people still alive and to hand over these documents to Algeria.

8796
CSO: 4519/42

ALGERIA

COOPERATION WITH FRANCE IN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY POSSIBLE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1878, 6 Nov 81 p 2811

/Text/ Mitterrand's forthcoming trip to Algiers could be an opportunity to discuss several projects of French-Algerian cooperation. This is all the more likely to happen if it turns out that an agreement is reached before then on the price of gas and if OPEC finds again a certain measure of unity among its ranks. The outcome of the negotiations on hydrocarbons will really boost Algeria's earnings.

In this connection, the present report circulated by the AGEFI /expansion unknown/ adds that in the industrial sphere the main development expected is the signing of contracts involving the automotive industry (passenger cars and industry vehicles). But French car manufacturers, with Renault at the top of the list, are going to face a strong competition. Right now, Algeria has several projects on the drawing board. These projects involve the purchase of finished vehicles and the building of an automotive plant.

According to information provided by the news agency, the first negotiations will deal with the purchase of between 20,000 and 30,000 passenger cars and with the purchase of commercial vehicles for a reported total value of between 700 and 1,000 million francs. Regarding the sale of passenger cars, the two French manufacturers are contending with a Japanese competitor as well as with Volkswagen and Fiat. Lately, these last two companies have been supplying the Algerian market, the first through its Brazilian subsidiary and the second by the intermediary of its Spanish associate SEAT (a partnership which has now been dissolved).

As for the car plant, it is said that the project has been given prominence again. But the Algerians are reported to have introduced some changes in their plans lowering the amount of local integration. Let us recall, the AGEFI goes on to say, that the plant being envisaged should be capable of making 100,000 cars a year while, right now, there is an estimated market of 70,000 cars a year. But the demand could be higher. Renault, which already signed a contract in 1970 only to see it canceled, seems to stand a good chance of getting the business if the project comes to fruition.

8796
CSO: 4519/42

OCEAN TRANSPORT DISPUTE WITH FRENCH SHIPOWNERS CLARIFIED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2746

[Text] Early this month we published a notice from the Nord-Manche-Atlantique French Shipowners Group, dealing with practical implementation of the inter-governmental agreement governing trade between France and Algeria and calling for an equitable sharing of the traffic--50 percent for French owners and 50 percent for Algerian owners. Noting that this distribution has not been put rigorously into effect in every field, but only in a general and intermittent way, in accordance with the decisions of the Conference, the notice said: "In the context of the above, the French shipowners group asserts that merchandise may be carried on ships of either of the two flags indiscriminately, without regard whatsoever to destination. Any special convention giving preference to one flag over the other is contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Franco-Algerian governmental maritime accords." (MTM of 9 October 1981).

While not disputing the facts as stated in the notice, CNAN (Algerian National Navigation Company) underlines the fact that the Algerian-French maritime accord states that traffic will be shared between the two merchant fleets proportionally on the basis of the amount of transport resources each fleet has available. The Algerian commercial shipping industry asserts that if more of the business in 1981 between the Nord-Manche-Atlantique region and Algeria has gone to the Algerian fleet than to its French partner, the reason lies in the fact that the former offered shippers more reliable service, by maintaining regular service to French ports, while the French shipowners interrupted the circulation of their vessels.

Our readers will recall that we published in early July a notice from the French Expositions Committee (CFE), calling on French exporters, especially those exhibiting at the Algiers International Fair, to ship their goods via Atlantic and Mediterranean ports, because of a temporary interruption of maritime service between Algeria and ports in northern France. They will also recall that CNAN issued a "correction" noting that the interruption of service between the ports of the Manche and Algeria was not in any way the fault of Algerian ships, which planned to continue serving Caen, Rouen and Dunkerque with the same frequency as in the past (MTM of 3 July, p 1760 and 24 July, p 1931).

CNAN hopes that shippers will understand that an intergovernmental maritime accord dividing up the cargo business must take into consideration the legitimate interests of the users of maritime transport, who should not bear the cost of a voluntary decrease in transport service.

9516
CSO: 4519/41

ELECTION TO POPULAR COMMITTEES DESCRIBED

London THE MAGHREB REVIEW in English No 5-6, Sep-Dec 81 pp 99-103

[Article by J. Davis]

[Text]

This note consists largely of ethnography, and it describes the conduct of an election in Ajdabiya in 1979. That election was not typical in all respects—the violence for example was unusual and it is unlikely that the heterogeneous and newly established populations of Tripoli, Benghazi, perhaps Sabha, express their internal oppositions in quite the same ways as Ajdabiyans do. Nevertheless, the purpose and form of elections are common to all Libya, and are related to the doctrines of *The Green Book*. It is likely that some features of Ajdabiyan elections are found also in other small-to-middling towns and settlements.

The election was to select members from the Ajdabiya Basic People's Congress (the nearest analogy in English would be 'constituency': it is the basic territorial division of the masses) to serve on the sixteen district popular committees which run government services for the district—electricity and justice, telecommunications and health and so on. Ajdabiya is one of six settlements which elect members to the committees, and it is by far the largest: of the total population, about 45,000, some 40,000 live in Ajdabiya; but each settlement elects two members to each committee. The protagonists in the election are the main groupings of the population, which are *qaba'il* 'tribes'. The most numerous are probably Zāwiya who in the past have swept the board in Ajdabiya town, although they do not dominate in the committees because they do not have enough representatives to secure the chairmanships. Zāwiya own land to the south and south-east of Ajdabiya, and are dominant in the southern oases of Kufra, Rabbiana, Tazarbu. They are relatively mixed: a result of their involvement in the southern trade is that many Zāwiya, authentically derived in the patriline, have Sudanese mothers, grandmothers, grandmothers, great-grandmothers. A result of their responsibilities to their slaves after the abandonment of slavery is that three of the five sections have several black lineages, co-responsible but not intermarrying with free Zāwiya lineages. Zāwiya have always welcomed affiliating groups: their control of the remote desert made their land a refuge from Turkish and Italian government, and the Zāwiya tribe contains many such groups, assimilated in a variety of ways.

Zāwiya are regarded askance by the two other large groups, who compare the relative purity of their descent from the Princess Sa'ada, their much longer settlement in the coastal sub-desert, their claim to *hurr* status and their long association with Turkish government to the rather mongrel pedigree of the rougher new Zāwiya arrivals from the desert, some of whose lineages formerly had client status to the Sa'adi groups. The Majābr are the traditional rivals of the Zāwiya, and are outnumbered by them. They are allied with the Maǧārba, landowners of the area between Ajdabiya and Sirte, neighbours and occasional allies with the al-Qaḍḍāffi to the west. The Maǧārba command the support of half a dozen client groups living in the smaller settlements of the district and the shaikh of the Maǧārba in Ajdabiya, 'Abdulnabi al Ḥaṭaš, uses their votes to select the chairmen of committees.

The notion of election is one of the obscurer points in *The Green Book*, which merely says that basic people's congresses elect (*yaktāru*, always translated as 'choose' in the English version) members of popular congress and of popular committees. Election is under-emphasized, far more stress is placed on the abolition of parties, and on the directness of democracy. The essence of the Third Universal Way is that government is never taken from the people, never seized by a party, a tribe or sect. The nation is too big for all the masses to meet

together to govern, and some individuals have to be chosen to run governmental institutions (the Popular Committees) and others to supervise them (the Popular Congresses). Each district therefore has a complete set of committees and a congress, and is theoretically autonomous. Each district also provides members of the National Popular Congress and their task is to supervise government at the national level.

It is difficult for a Westerner to dissociate the two notions of election and representation—what else, after all, could elections be for?—but Qaḍḍāffi's claim is that the scheme of government outlined in *The Green Book* describes a system which is non-representational, a direct democracy without a hierarchy of authority. The claim is made of the scheme as a whole, and there is no discussion of the purpose of elections, nor of the theory of elections-which-do-not-produce-representatives. It is worth noting that the Westerners' difficulty is shared by many Libyans who were familiar with the procedure and purpose of election to create members of King 'Idris' parliament and to send representatives to the Arab Socialist Union in the first years of the revolution: the notion that there can be no election without representation does not seem to be part of a purely Western web of thought. The Ajdabiyan elections of 1979 are not typical in all respects of all Libyan elections; nevertheless an account of them shows that they have features which can be directly attributed to the doctrines of *The Green Book*, and which are part of Libyan election procedure. Moreover the triennial elections are the political institution in which most Libyans are most involved, and it therefore seems worthwhile to complement commentaries on the political ideas of the Libyan revolution with an offering of basic grass-roots ethnography.

The elections were due in January, by which time there were two lists of candidates prepared, one by 'Abdulnabi Haṭaš in consultation with his Majbari assistant and the shaikhs of his dependent groups, the other by the leaders of three sections of Zāwiya, the Director of Education who was Zāwiyi and standing for re-election, and by one or two other young men. The elections were postponed until February, confidently expected on 1 February, and after that day the chairman of the popular congress 'phoned each afternoon to Tripoli to ask if the elections were due. On the evening of the 6th the Ministry of Information Landrovers toured Ajdabiya announcing that ward committees would be elected on the 7th, popular committees (which are what this paper is about) on the 8th. On that day the voters assembled on the town's football pitch, together with a television crew, some police and an electoral commission headed by a Captain 'Awud from Benghazi, staffed by members of the Ajdabiya district People's Congress. Each voter who entered showed his identity card for an electoral officer to check his right to vote, and to record his name and number, At 10.00 a.m. the gates were shut—anyone might leave, no one might enter. That is to prevent a sudden influx of new voters to swing the result. In Ajdabiya on that day the turn-out was 2,300-odd. The captain then presented the candidates for the first committee, as it happened, the development committee. They included a young primary school teacher supplied to the Mağārba list by the Awlad Shaikh, and a professor of economics from Benghazi university with a United States doctorate, unfortunately unable to be present himself, but supported by the Zāwiya. The captain proposed that, since the total number of voters was known, it would be necessary to count only the votes for one candidate. And he asked the voters to divide themselves into two halves, each to occupy one half of the pitch. The Mağārba were then marshalled into the westerly quarter, a teller's desk set up near the goal posts, and the voters walked from the west quarter behind the goal posts to the east quarter past a clerk. The clerk touched each elector on the head, and counted each poll aloud over a megaphone. After one hundred polls he started again from one, and the teller marked off the hundred votes. A police officer kept an independent check.

When the Mağārba vote was announced at 1,235 the Zāwiya immediately protested that there were Mağārba present who had no right to vote: after a check of identity cards some left, and the vote was begun again, this time counting both groups of supporters as they passed behind their goals. The time was 1.30, three hours after the first count began. Near the end of the second count a fight broke out at the Zāwiya goal because the teller, secretary to the district popular congress, therefore technically above suspicion, but also a Mağārba, therefore watched very carefully, claimed to have recorded 900 votes. The Zāwiya thought it should be 1,000, and so did the policeman. The teller offered to accept their count, but this was rejected on the ground he might have stolen more than 100. Stones were thrown, and the teller was hustled off the pitch into a police car, driven hurriedly away. In the discussion which followed Zāwiya argued that five hours had passed and no one was undisputedly elected: in view of the late hour and the irregularities (another Mağārba member of the popular congress, doubling as an electoral officer, was suspected of cheating and was escorted out by police) it would be better to have the elections another day. The Mağārba leaders resisted this. They thought they were in the majority, and were right to think the Zāwiya could muster more voters after such a confrontation. The captain left the pitch to telephone to Tripoli, returned to say that elections would be held again on Saturday.

In fact, later that evening, the loudspeaker vans cruised the town announcing the election for Friday,

the next day. And on the next day the Zāwiya did indeed muster a majority of 117 votes in the first count. This time the Maǧārba protested, and did so so vigorously that the electoral commission's table was overturned and Captain 'Awud's arm was broken He was taken to hospital and the police put a *cordon sanitaire* across the pitch while the chairman of the popular congress 'phoned Tripoli to find out how to conduct an election when the returning officer had retired hurt. After an hour, and for no comprehensible reason, the police cordon was removed. A fight broke out within minutes, and lasted for several hours. Shots were fired—everybody agreed by civilians—the fighting spread to the nearby streets, several people were wounded, and the election was again abandoned. During the night the hospital was sealed off, so that no one might know precisely who was wounded nor how many. The rumour spread that an unidentified victim had died of his wounds.

For the next few days Ajdabiya was extremely unsettled. Impromptu discussion groups formed whenever a man sat outside his house. Young Zāwiya talked with anger and shock, lips and hands trembling, about the perfidy of the Maǧārba. Some older men, middle-aged, went into quasi-mourning, unshaven, heads wrapped in scarves, eyes red, serious and withdrawn. Sidi Hassan, a Zāwiya ward in the south-east of the town, was sealed off with a road block manned by twenty or so young adults armed with pick-axe handles. A marabout, a Zaidani, turned up and toured the streets in his Mercedes; a deputation of Zāwiya went to Benghazi to protest about the irresponsible withdrawal of the police. Discussions took place in the street behind the barricades, and in private houses, about future tactics. Meanwhile the Maǧārba met near the Post Office to discuss their tactics. A number of reinforcements from the outlying settlements turned up and camped in a clump of trees a few kilometres to the west of the town.

The original Zāwiya list had included a number of men from other groups: this, Zāwiya argued, showed their good faith, their lack of obsession with archaic loyalties, and their reluctance to dominate Ajdabiya. As a result of the unprovoked attack by Maǧārba they decided to raise the stakes, and drew up a new list of candidates who were all Zāwiya, and all possessed of doctorates. 'Doctor' is a title which may be used somewhat freely when the heat of argument leads you to assert that your tribal group is the one most qualified by objective criteria of modernity to rule a district. A third attempt at election was held on 14 February. An entire election committee was brought in by bus from Benghazi, and the locale was changed to the playground of a school which had one entrance, telephones, and offices where any necessary discussions might be held in privacy. Troops, also from Benghazi, lined the perimeter of the playground, and were posted with machine guns on the roofs of buildings overlooking the election. All voters were searched as they entered the school gates and were relieved of pocket-knives, heavy belts, walking-sticks and various few more obviously offensive weapons. They were also counted unofficially according to how they would vote by their own tellers, as they went in. What happened next is rather indeterminate, but at some point—either after their own private count had been completed, or after the first vote had been taken—the Zāwiya protested to the electoral commission that they were outnumbered by four votes (1,261 to 1,257) because Maǧārba had been allowed to infiltrate voters from the outlying districts of Bišr and Marāda. They were overruled, and left the election *en bloc*. The election proceeded while they sat in the streets near the school listening to the announcements of successive unanimous votes of Maǧārba: 'candidates without'—as one bank manager said indignantly and exaggeratedly—'without a school-leaving certificate between them'.

In a British election, where there is a secret ballot and polling stations are open for the voters to call at any time during the day, the electoral contest is not really a contest of voting: the struggle goes on in the weeks before the pre-announced polling day as the candidates persuade electors to vote for them: polling is the measure of their success; it is not as much a direct part of the contest as it is in Libya or as it is in Parliamentary voting or some trades union elections. That is one reason Libyan elections are in some sense a direct confrontation. Another is that the voting itself becomes competitive because in the system of direct democracy established after the publication of *The Green Book* there is no secret ballot—each man has to exercise his share of the sovereignty of the masses with responsibility, as a British Parliamentarian has to. When a system precludes counting papers, heads have to be polled; when more than one vote has to be cast (quite easy on a ballot paper) the proceedings turn out quite lengthy because in theory each head has to be counted in each vote. Those are practical consequences of a theory of direct democracy, and they increase tension: voting itself is a confrontation, and it is a confrontation necessarily lasting several hours.

If Libya has no secret ballot, still less does it have parties. They—like 'tribes, sects, classes'—attempt to seize the government in order to dominate their opponents, which is dictatorial. It is because parties are undemocratic that no political debate occurs of a kind familiar enough in the parliamentary democracies. There are no candidates' addresses, no speeches, no attempt to persuade the electors that one candidate's policies are better than another's. Voting therefore takes place between ideologically undifferentiated candidates, an that is another feature of Libyan elections. The point is not to try to explain the violence in Ajdabiya (not all

Libyan elections are violent; not all parliamentary elections are peaceful) but to show in the first instance how specific features of elections are related to the high exotic theory of *The Green Book*. You might say that non-ideological elections are all very well in a one-party system, where unopposed candidates are returned by unanimous votes of all registered voters. But if you have contested elections and no ideology, the law of vacuums, which in this instance says roughly that conflicts cannot take place without an ostensible reason, the law of vacuums allows you to predict that alignments will occur on some principle, even if it is a principle which neither you, nor Colonel Qaḍḍāffi for that matter, would accept as strictly speaking political. It is true that Zāwiya claimed greater modernity—more educated candidates than their opponents, but so did the Mağārba; moreover, Zāwiya modernity was gained at the cost in some instances of presenting candidates who could not or would not turn up on the election day. It is true that Zāwiya complained bitterly of the solidary tribalism of their opponents, which forced them into a contestatory tribalism; but so also did the Mağārba.

In fact the Ajdabiya elections on the nādi football pitch turned into something very like the opposition of elements in a segmentary system. Public voting together with confinement in a limited space, together with the absence of formal political ideological discriminators turn the count itself into the contest, and change the assembly of the masses into the massing-effect of the opposition of segmentary elements. In addition to the formal political institutions, moreover, there are conflicts from tradition: Zāwiya and Majābr are ancient rivals, and have killed each other in elections since 1952; Mağārba align themselves with their fellow Sa'adi, otherwise in a minority, against the upstarts.

Some confirmation of this account comes from evidence of the elections in Kufra and Jālū districts. In Kufra the main political contestants are two sections of Zāwiya, the 'Awlād 'Amira and the Mannai'a. In 1975 'Awlād 'Amira took over office from the Mannai'a. In 1979 the Mannai'a regained office with Jlūlāt support, placing various Jlūlāt candidates in chairmanships. Voting was said to be very close. Again, in Jālu district the three communities tend to vote on segmentary lines: the oasis of Jālū itself, inhabited mostly by Majābr, vies with the Zāwiya of 'Ajḳarra oasis for the support of the 'Aujli (mostly of Berber origin) in 'Aujla oasis. However, since each of these settlements is more or less homogeneous, and each is a sub-district in its own right, the main competition is to secure the chairmanships of the committees, and the elections within each settlement are uncontested and unanimous.

The voting in elections, partly because of the practical consequences of ideological decisions, becomes something like a segmentary confrontation in which social controls secure solidary support for a bloc of candidates. There is no question, for instance, of voting for candidates from more than one list. Even if there were grounds for doing so—for being convinced that one candidate was for some practical or ideological reason better than another, the publicity of the ballot and the heat of the moment would make it very difficult to cross the pitch.

Although passions are aroused, and the elections are keenly contested, turn-out is relatively low. No woman has ever voted in Ajdabiya, and that excludes more than half the electorate. If Ajdabiya's population is around 40,000 that leaves about 18,000 males. Of those, about two-thirds are not of voting age, giving an effective male electorate of around 6,000–7,000; of those about 2,500 vote, a turn-out of 35–40 per cent. The non-voters include residents without local affiliation—traders from Misurata, for example. They also include people disillusioned with politics: one man, for example, thought that his cousin, a Zāwiyi, should not stand for re-election to the education committee. But he could not go to the election and vote against him, and so he stayed away. Others thought it made no difference who held office, and they too stayed away. People have diverse reasons for doing nothing, and the abstainers undoubtedly have more reasons than those listed here: on the other hand it seems fair to say that the inbuilt quasi-segmentary confrontation in the elections discourages precisely those people who might be inclined to resist the tendency to segmentalism.

That is not to say, by any means, that all those who do go to elections go intending to demonstrate sectional solidarity. The first day in Ajdabiya, for instance, many of the younger people pointed out some of the differences between parliamentary and direct democracy, insisting that what was about to occur was closer to the classical Athenian model than anything that might occur in Britain. They turned out not far wrong (Athenian politics being particularly liable to produce conflict); but their disappointment, even shame at the failure to put the system into proper effect, was quite apparent. Some people—particularly those who plan the lists of candidates and canvass support for them among section and lineage leaders—some people undoubtedly do try to gain advantage, against Zāwiya, against Mağārba as the case may be, by appealing to as wide a cross-section of the population as they can. When they are opposed, their supporters rally round, and a quasi-segment is formed. It is in the nature of segmentary systems that a segment is called into being by opposition; and it is therefore always true that 'the other side started it'. That applies also to the electoral groupings, or quasi-segments.

There is one final point to make, and it has to be made very inadequately in a short note such as this. It is possible, not at all misleading, to understand the illogicalities and inconsistencies of *The Green Book* as arising from the very real difficulties of combining two models

both highly valued by Libyans, each indicating contrary courses of action. On the one hand an egalitarian, acephalous, Sunni tradition in which each man struggles to maintain his personal sovereignty; on the other, a bureaucratic state providing education, health and welfare services, electricity and water, telegrams and justice, but apparently necessitating both hierarchy and representation. Of course, Qaḍḍāffi's theory of popular democracy, of government without representation does not apply to all the state apparatus: the military, the police, the petroleum industry and the R.C.C. itself are not mentioned in *The Green Book* and do not have popular committees and are not controlled by People's Congress. But where the theory does apply the issue of election is crucial: to Western eyes, and also to many Libyans, election and representation are inseparable, and are closely associated too, with party and with ideology. What *The Green Book* proposes is the separation of election and representation, and the exclusion of representation and ideology from politics. It asserts that government can co-exist with personal sovereignty, that its formal institutions can be subject to the rules of the non-Western egalitarian acephalous model. On the other hand, some more restricted number of persons has to take car of the day-to-day running of what are quite complex governmental tasks: the answer is elections which do not produce representatives, in which popular direct democracy is undiminished. It is a difficult notion, even a paradoxical one. The Ajdabiyans in 1979 clearly assimilated elections to the traditional egalitarian and acephalous model, in which personal sovereignty was maintained by the mutual support and opposition of a segmentary system.

CSO: 4500/67-E

MANAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES IN COASTAL AREA

London THE MAGHREB REVIEW in English No 5-6, Sep-Dec 81 pp 104-114

[Text]

Abstract

The character of the renewable natural resources of coastal Libya has always constrained agricultural development. The paper examines the experience of those responsible for managing various phases of Libya's economic development of the recent past. The period of Italian colonization will be discussed briefly; the experience in the pre-oil phase as well as that of the oil era before and after the revolution will be treated in more detail. The changing status of renewable natural resources is described and the impact of environmental management policies evaluated.

Agricultural Resources in the Semi-arid Mediterranean

Agricultural development in the Mediterranean basin can largely be explained in terms of the disposition of water resources. The seasonal deficiency in summer rainfall restricts agriculture to the winter season except in those areas where groundwater, surface storage or rivers provide a source of water for irrigation. The quantity of water available wholly to support summer farming, and to supplement that in the winter, varies from the substantial quantities (50 billion m^3 per year approximately) brought to the region by major rivers, such as the Nile, to much smaller volumes (for example under 1 billion m^3 along 200 km coastal tracts in Libya) which find their way into the coastal aquifers of the basin. The pattern of the availability of water for agriculture has always been conditioned by climatic factors and these are still inescapable in wholly rain-fed regions. The sources of water for irrigation have, however, been subject to two complementary management strategies. First there has been a constantly upward trend in the demand for irrigation water and secondly there has been a tendency to improve the effectiveness of water management at various levels from the individual farmer to the government agency responsible for water resources.

From an economic point of view the analysis of the problem of how to optimize the utilization of agricultural resources[1] in the semi-arid Mediterranean lands is straightforward. Land is rarely a constraint on activity; water on the other hand is always a constraint. Labour and capital vary in availability and examples of economies with unhibited supplies of labour are juxtaposed with ones with unlimited supplies of capital. The factor which is only slightly less constraining than labour on the optimal overall utilization of agricultural resources is the shortage of that specialist element in the labour force experienced in managing new technologies and systems of water distribution. This last constraint affects the use of water at farm level but has even more important implications in higher levels of the regional and national institutions responsible for water management.

The temperature regime of the Mediterranean basin provides its farmers with many advantages over competitors in Northern Europe (Amiran, 1978, p. 122). Where water supplies can be assumed throughout the year then two or three crops per year can be raised in the region. The temptation to take advantage of the favourable growing temperatures has led many farmers, usually supported in their intent, initially at least, by governments, to push for high levels of production, expanding horizontally and also intensifying irrigation, often with serious consequences for the resources upon which sustained agricultural production depends.

One part of the region, the coastlands of northern Africa, have experienced the disorientating occupation by colonial powers which extended until 1951 in Libya and into the 1960s further west. The French and Italian occupations extended cultivation and irrigation, in the

case of Libya doubling the total area farmed and with that expansion more than doubling the irrigated area. The experience gained in the first half of the twentieth century in utilizing northern Africa's natural resources revealed the very limited nature of the water resources, and strategies were developed which took into account the need for production systems with low water using requirements. Dryland farming was an important element in the agricultural strategy, raising grain and tree crops which were able to withstand the low rainfall. Even so the irrigated farming which was implemented did begin to affect the coastal groundwater resources and water levels did begin to fall in the coastal reservoirs (Allan, 1971, p. 212). Extensive studies ensued to locate other deeper groundwater reserves but none was discovered which was not unusable because of high levels of salinity.

Libyan Agricultural Resources (Figures 1 and 2)

Agricultural development in Libya since the colonial era (i.e. since 1951) has been particularly interesting because it was achieved through a number of phases. In these phases the mix of the factors of production changed dramatically. Libya achieved independence in



Figure 1. Oil production and revenue. Source: Census and Statistical Department 1972a and 1977.

1951 and for the first ten independent years the economy of the country was supported by aid from outside in the form of direct grants, mainly from the United States and Britain and by rent for military bases also from the United States and Britain. Oil revenues, which commenced in 1961, marked the beginning of the second phase. In the early 1960s oil revenues replaced aid and by 1965 Libya was beginning to enjoy the benefits of oil revenues. By 1968 there were many indicators that the economy had changed and new patterns emerged in government and private spending. The agricultural sector was attracting substantial investment, especially



Figure 2. Libyan oil revenues and development spending 1962–1977. Source: Census and Statistical Department 1972 and 1977.

by private individuals; the area cultivated was being extended, the irrigated area increased each year and immigrant labour worked on more and more farms (Allan *et al.*, 1973). The third phase came with the revolution of 1969 which occurred at a point when Libya's oil income was rising and Libya had an especially strong place amongst oil exporting countries. In the first two years of revolutionary government the Libyan administration skilfully exploited its position in the world oil market. Oil production was cut but revenues were maintained through the higher prices achieved. It was at this period that Libya gained its reputation as the maverick amongst the O.P.E.C. producers; a reputation which has been sustained through the 1970s.

The impact on the agricultural sector of the changing economic circumstances was most significant as we shall see in the area of agricultural policy. In other words the direction and volume of investment changed with increasing revenues, and especially with the change of government in 1969. The agricultural sector did not prove to be responsive to the increased level of investment, however, because of the two unavoidable constraints of limited environmental resources and the shortage of advanced agricultural management.

Libya's coastal plains and uplands are rich in some resources. Solar energy for crop production is adequate for crop production throughout the year. Other natural resources are poorly disposed. Soils as in other arid and semi-arid areas are poor, being generally sandy, and because of the high summer temperature regimes they are poor in organic matter content with negative consequences for their fertility and especially their moisture-holding capacity. There are technologies, however, which make it possible to use such soils, but these techniques can only be deployed if there is a reliable source of irrigation water. Libya unfortunately has no flowing rivers, the potential for surface storage is extremely limited and groundwater reservoirs in the coastal regions are nowhere rich. Only in the remote south of the country are there substantial groundwater resources and these are the finite, fossil resources of the Kufrah and Sarir regions in the east and of the Fezzan in the south-west. This paper is not concerned with these regions, but in the Libyan context the water resources of the south are important both in actual potential, so far only realized very partially and without any economic rationale (Allan, 1979, p. 25), and especially in the opportunity for extravagant investments which they afford. Awareness overtook successive regimes in Libya that the agricultural resources at the coast were limited, and in due course the very big spending targets of the 1970s could only be achieved by pouring money into the expensive enterprises located in remote southern regions. It was recognized meanwhile that the absorptive capacity of the coastal agricultural schemes was limited by the quality of the environmental resources.

The coastal strip[2] in the area to the south of Tripoli and to a lesser extent near Benghazi, and the coastal uplands of the Jabal Nafusah in the west and the Jabal al Akhdar in the east, have sufficient rainfall to support dryland farming. The seasonal pattern of rainfall limits rain-fed farming to regions within the 200 mm isohyet, that is to an area which is only 2 per cent of Libya of which less than half is cultivable for reasons of terrain and soil conditions. Even 200 mm annual average rainfall is not, however, ideal for dryland farming in regions in which high temperatures and dry winds occur protractedly; a level of 300 mm or upwards assures reliable yields and the area with this higher expectation is approximately 0·7 per cent of the country of which only one-third is usable because of broken terrain and poor soil. In other words one is considering approximately 17,000 km² of cultivable land with more than 200 mm average annual rainfall and approximately 4,000 km² with 300 mm average assuming reasonable crop yields. Pallas (1977, p. 2) suggests that there are

9,400 km² in the Gefara and Jabal Nafusah region and 13,000 km² in the Benghazi and Jabal al Akhdar region with 250–300 mm of annual rain and confirms the limited extent of the area which could sustain reliable rain-fed agriculture.

A measure of the poor quality of the soil resources and marginal rainfall are the low wheat yields achieved even in areas with over 300 mm annual rainfall. Yields of under 1 tonne per hectare were usual in 1980 in favoured areas (compare dryland yields in the United States which average 1·2 tonnes per hectare and in Australia 1·25 tonnes per hectare), and in tracts with 200 mm average rainfall yields fell to 0·5 tonne per hectare. The potential of areas with favourable rains could approach 2 tonnes per hectare and the lower rainfall areas could be pushed towards 1 tonne per hectare. The main problem in Libyan dryland farming is the need to utilize areas of extremely low rainfall in which agricultural activity must always be hazardous. In other countries with extensive rain-fed agricultural areas enduring low rainfall of about 300 mm annually these tracts lie on the edge of large areas with assured rains. The main burden of production is gained from those favoured areas; the production from the marginal areas may be desirable but is not essential. In Libya on the other hand the main production has to be gained from marginal tracts with consequent hazards with respect to the achievement of consistent self-sufficiency in rain-fed crops. Special management strategies which accommodate to crop failure in dry years have to be devised and arrangements made at national level to balance the inter-year variations in production. Such arrangements are obviously not difficult for a government enriched by oil revenues, but we shall see that though oil riches are useful in cushioning a nation against environmental realities, they do not contribute to a good decision-making base for the management of marginal environmental resources. Oil riches feed optimism, optimism impairs perception, and impaired perception leads to damaging management strategies. This sequence which has been observed in the Libyan government's approach to the use of coastal water resources, will also be shown to have been experienced in the management of rain-fed farming experiments on the Gefara Plain and to a lesser extent on the Jabal al Akhdar.

The availability of apparently unlimited supplies of capital has proved to be a poor basis for resource management. Capital resources for agricultural development have increased in volume progressively, and the proportion of national development spending allocated to agriculture has been stimulated at a number of stages by the ill-favoured 'optimum' referred to above. First the five-year plan (1964–1968) suggested an allocation of over 17 per cent of development spending to agriculture (Farley, 1971). Next the revolution brought an even less informed boost to proposed agricultural investment. By 1969 the enthusiasm for agricultural spending had slackened, at least at government level for the very good reason that it had been recognized that further investment in irrigation of the type made in the 1960s made no sense in the light of the progressive depletion of coastal aquifers.[8] The revolutionary regime increased allocations to agriculture and especially to the development of water using schemes. It was not until 1976 that the revolutionary regime began to recognize the need to reverse this policy. The indicators came in the form of regulations constraining the planting of summer crops such as tomatoes, melons and citrus with high water requirements, later reinforced by measures such as the closing of tomato-paste factories. By 1980 the Libyan government was grappling with the extremely difficult task of attempting to reorganize the agriculture of the coastal strip and in this was trying in one stroke to implement a policy of redistributing land according to socialist principles, and at the same time to create management units consistent with economic production and regulated water utilization.

Whereas the capital resources of Libya after oil enabled a national indulgence in an ill-founded optimistic agricultural policy, there were other constraints which impeded the realization of the optimistic targets. Labour to man new enterprises was already in short supply by 1969, but with the strong relationship with Egypt in the years immediately after the revolution farm labour began to enter Libya from Egypt in large numbers. An exact breakdown of immigrant labour is not available but it is likely that well over 50,000 Egyptian farm labourers were present in Libya in the early 1970s until 1975, when relations with Cairo changed (see Figure 3). Libya imported labour steadily during the years of oil revenues and by 1975 10 per cent of the population was from abroad and towards 50 per cent of the working population was from overseas. A small but significant element of this population consisted of professional staff knowledgeable about land and water resources and their



Figure 3. Passenger arrivals 1961–1976 by region. Source: Census and Statistical Department 1972–1977.

management, but though helpful these staff and consultants could only ameliorate and not solve the problems created by the shortage of Libyan professional staff.

Local staff were essential for the effective monitoring of surveys and the evaluation of plans and recommendations upon which sound national policy could be based. The scarce Libyan expertise was impossibly overstretched in the unrewarding task of managing a polyglot, multicultured, and often incompatible community of experts. It was recognized that there was being accumulated 'priceless experience in the various fields of land reclamation, seeding, planning and reconstruction ... ' (Jodah, 1978, p. 16) but in practice this experience was being assimilated by only a small proportion of Libya's professional agronomists and agricultural engineers. This is no way of measuring the degree of the constraint imposed by the shortage of Libyan professional staff on the direction and quality of agricultural policy and on the productivity of the agricultural sector, but in the estimation of the author it was even more important than the poor quality of the environmental resources of coastal Libya.

It is not always easy to relate to the realities of agricultural change midst the strident rhetoric which attends agricultural policy making and pronouncements about intended investment. National plans before and after 1969 gave agriculture a significant place in proposed economic development. The first ten years of oil revenues left the government uncertain about the capacity of the agricultural sector for effective absorption of investment, and Figure 4 shows this hesitancy of the late 1960s. The diagram also shows that agricultural investment took off again in the early 1970s at a higher rate than in the 1965-1969 period, but not at a higher rate than in the period 1962–1965. The period of revolutionary government has nevertheless been associated with a strong emphasis in agricultural investment. Figure 5 shows this emphasis very clearly.

The rhetoric attending these policies, is not difficult to find, nor are the ideas which have inspired and legitimized them. The optimism of Libya's agricultural policy makers has apparently been inspired since 1969 by words from the Qur'ān which provide the foreword for a publication drawing attention to achievements in the Jabal al Akhdar coastal highlands:

In the name of God Most Gracious, Most Merciful

It is he who sends down
Rain from the sky
From it ye drink,
And out of it (grows),
The vegetation on which
Ye feed your cattle.
With it He produces
For you corn, olives,
Date-palms, grapes,
And every kind of fruit
Verily in this is a Sign
For those who give thought

(Executive Authority for Jabal al Akhdar, 1978, p. 3)

A sense that mismanagement of otherwise *rich* resources



Figure 4. Estimates of development spending by sector 1962–1971 and 1970–1977. Source: Census and Statistical Department 1972b and Secretariat of Planning 1978.

was the reason for the poor agricultural heritage of the revolutionary government is evident in statements made by the Libyan leader. 'Our agricultural revolution is

now continuing in the fields where it will progress day after day, multiplying its revenues year after year and, with God's assistance, it will transform our land left for too long neglected and desert, into richly fertile soil, which shall abundantly reward our struggling people, who liberated it from our colonist intruders' (Moammar Qathafi, quoted in Executive Authority for Jabal al Akhdar, 1978, p. 5). Reinforced by the recognition of the vulnerability of those who are not self-sufficient in food—'There is no independence for those who secure their food from abroad' (Moammar Qathafi in Executive Authority for Jabal al Akhdar, 1978, p. 83)—and enthused by a romantic view of resources and potential in such areas as the coastal uplands of north-east Libya 'where the dreams of golden crops sleeping in our hills



Figure 5. Department spending by sector 1962–1977 and some other indicators. Source: Census and Statistical Department, 1972b and Secretariat Planning 1978.

unite with the discovery of New Horizons arising from behind our hills' (Bashir Jodah, in Executive Authority for Jabal al Akhdar, 1978, p. 16), policies were initiated and pursued which have proved to be inconsistent with the resource potential of Libya's semi-arid coastlands.

In the following sections the damaging effects of the dangerous inconsistency of perception and reality will be examined first with respect to the intensification of irrigated farming on the Gefara Plain and secondly to the attempts to extend dryland farming beyond the 200 mm isohyet.

Intensifying Irrigated Agriculture in Coastal Libya

The twentieth century has seen progressively higher demands being made on the coastal water resources. All summer agriculture and a proportion of that in the winter depends on groundwater. In the days of traditional technology of animal-powered water lifting there was a limit to the amount of water that could be raised and a limit to the area in which irrigation could be deployed as animals could not be expected to raise water much more than 10 m. Irrigated farming was restricted to the strip of land immediately adjacent to the coast where water levels were at no more than 6 m. The coastal irrigated gardens rarely extended further inland than 3 km.

The arrival of Italian colonists, with a different technology, extended the area of potential irrigation to points as far as 40 km from the coasts where water levels were generally about over 30 m below the surface. However there were some places where the particular configuration of topography was such that water stood at or close to the surface even 20 km from the coast in 1912 when Italian scientists and farmers first began to make records of water resources at places such as Siwani bin Yadim, 20 km to the south of Tripoli.

The main strategy of the Italian settlers was to use dryland farming techniques, and severe restrictions were imposed on the extension of irrigated farming by the regulation of the number and spacing of wells. Nevertheless the groundwater resource was affected by the Italian pumping (Allan, 1971, p. 173). The thirty years of Italian occupation witnessed the doubling of total cultivated area and to an equivalent increase in irrigation. Such figures are difficult to establish fairly as the utilization of land in the pre-colonial period was not permanent in precisely that area settled by Italian farmers. The tract they chose was the one used by Libyan graziers in period of drought and by farmers from the coastal gardens in years of favourable rains. Thus the area occupied by the Italians had performed an essential complementary role for both the settled and nomadic communities of northern Libya, and the intrusion was resisted by the Libyan people.

The ten years or so of British occupation brought few innovations and British policy was marked by its encouragement of the Italian farming community to stay on in north-western Libya. The Italian colonial presence had ended in eastern Libya during the hostilities of the Second World War soon after 1939. Italian agricultural

development made little impact on eastern Libya as Libyan resistance continued very actively until 1931, and many Italian farms were not developed and occupied until the late 1930s in Cyrenaica. Most agriculture in the eastern province was conducted according to dryland techniques.

The first decade of independence after 1951 saw little significant intensification of irrigated farming. There were some small government schemes such as that at Wadi Ki'am and Italian farms were sold to wealthy Palestinian exiles who brought with them much skill in citrus raising with related very high water using requirements.

It was not until the mid-1960s that the effect of the intensification of groundwater use became very evident. By 1969 the rate of decline had increased to 1 m per year at some parts 20 km from the coast (Figure 6). The evidence available in 1968 pointed to an increasing rate of decline and the policies, or rather their absence, in the early years of the revolutionary regime reinforced the mainly privately instigated water using ventures. Additional public finance in the form of grants and subsidies increased water using practices and groundwater levels did fall even more quickly in the early 1970s. The 1970s witnessed a growing recognition of the limited nature of the groundwater resource, and by 1976 there were clear signs that the government wished to curtail water use and if necessary agricultural production in the Gefara Plain. Resistrictions were placed on the planting of citrus, tomatoes and water melons, all crops which use water heavily (Allan and McLachlan, 1975, p. 36). By 1976 the rapid decline of water at points 20 km from the coast had reached 3 m per year and by 1978 the annual decline had reached a dramatic 5 m per year at Bin Gashir (Wozab and Obah, 1977; Floegel, 1978). In the summer of 1979, the water table of the upper aquifer at Bin Gashir was pumped to below sea level for the first time and the crossing of such emotive thresholds finally persuaded those responsible for initiating development schemes that the management of sustained agriculture depended on the careful use of groundwater, especially in coastal Libya.

That emphasis has been given to the state of the water resource rather than to the progress of agricultural production may seem excessive, but as already established, it is the water resource which is the major constraint on irrigated farming in coastal Libya. Its depletion has made it impossible to sustain existing levels of production never mind further intensification. Agricultural production did increase in the 1960s at the rate of between 2 and 4 per cent per year but this achievement, though considerable was only achieved at the expense of an impaired water resource. The use of water was completely unregulated and no attempt was made to introduce water conserving cropping patterns or irrigation practices. The private user was bent on maximization of his own interests and the government did not have the political stomach, in the pre- or post-revolutionary years, to implement the essential water legislation.

The institutionalized and environmental impediments to the appropriate development of irrigated farming in coastal Libya had reached such proportions by 1979 that the Libyan administration realized that only a drastic reorganization of irrigated farming could being the necessary integration of the control of water resources and measures which would at the same time increase agricultural production. An interventionist role has never been shirked by the revolutionary government. On the contrary there has been a progressive rationalization of economic activity and property ownership since 1969, such that by 1979 almost all commercial and industrial activity as well as housing and services were controlled by government agencies. The agricultural sector had been partially affected by this trend towards public intervention through capital invested in cultivation, irrigation and livestock, and indirectly through the control of the marketing of agricultural products. The proposals currently being contemplated are seen as inescapable if the irrigated farming of Libya's coastal strip is to be based on viable agricultural units capable of supporting a Libyan family with no outside labour. The economic, social and ideological implications are immense while the opportunity which the proposed reorganization would present for the rational management of the crucial, and much impaired, groundwater resource may be a last chance to reverse the trends in the 'over-developed' coastal strip.

The main stimulus to the reorganization of farming in the coastal strip would seem to be a political will to give as many people access to a viable farm unit. The intent is to increase agricultural production by amalgamating uneconomically small farms, to subsidize those larger holdings which require hired expatriate labour and to take over under-utilized farms, whether underutilized for reasons of their leisure and residence role for the owner or because of the part-time nature of the owner's agricultural activity. The institutional and social engineering involved in such reforms are consistent with the political development of Libya in the past decade, with equity in access to personal income and local participation in government (via popular committees) being the basic domestic political issues. The proposed changes are also, however, consistent with gaining a greater measure of control over the use of groundwater upon which all irrigated farming in coastal Libya depends.



Figure 6. The Gefara Plain showing the 200 mm isohyet and the location of the wheat scheme farms.

Extending Dryland Farming in the Gefara Plain and the Jabal al Akhdar

Whereas the development of groundwater proved to be an attractive proposition to private sector agriculture in the 1960s, the hazards of dryland farming were sufficient to deter any cultivation other than the usual traditional catch cropping. Even mature olive and almond groves were often neglected. The early years of the oil revenues also saw little public sector interest in dryland farming on the Gefara Plain, although the reclamation of former Italian farms on the Jabal al Akhdar did engage the National Agricultural Settlement Authority (N.A.S.A.). The original Italian holdings had always been designed as dryland farms. However, little progress was achieved by N.A.S.A. partly because of the difficulties of terrain, partly because of the unrealistically low levels of financial provision, but mainly because of the legal wrangles surrounding the ownership and use of land. The interests of the National Authority and the tribes of the Jabal al Akhdar were in conflict and solutions did not readily emerge in the context of distrust of central authority following the colonial experience.

Only one-third of the much less favourably endowed Gefara Plain received an annual average rainfall of more than 200 mm which is the level sufficient for dryland cultivation of grain. Areas with less than 200 mm of precipitation have traditionally been used for grazing and livestock production, although the Italian colonist did push olive plantations beyond the 200 mm line and supplemented rain-fed practices with irrigation. By 1968 there was much evidence that irrigated farming was being extended into very low rainfall areas (Allan *et al.*, 1973, p. 103) especially south of Ajaylat, Zāwiya and Suwani bin Yadim. Since 1969 this private sector activity has been overshadowed by large government irrigation projects such as that at Bir Tarfas and government schemes have been initiated in areas with less than 200 mm average rains. It is not with the methods and success of these schemes, however, that we are concerned here. The Libyan government is committed to being self-sufficient in grain (wheat and barley) and anticipates that a substantial amount of such grain will come from rain-fed areas in the Gefara Plain. In order to stimulate production the government has been paying high prices to farmers (Libyan Dinars 150 per ton in 1978) in order to stimulate production. This price is substantially higher than the world price but probably only twice the price of grain landed at Tripoli. The Secretariat for Land Reclamation and Settlement has since 1973 spent heavily on dryland schemes to the south of Tripoli.

Farming in marginal arid areas is always hazardous because of the years when rains are much below average In mounting the massive experiments on the sites in the Gefara shown in Table 1 the Libyan Secretariat for Land Reclamation and Settlement (since December 1978 part of the new Secretariat of Agriculture) has taken a considerable risk and the results of the experiment to date are interesting and salutary. All the sites have an annual average rainfall of less than 225 mm and some have less than 150 mm. Since the start of the schemes in the 1973–1974 season, rainfall has been much above average in 1973–1974, 1974–1975, 1975–1976, and especially favourable in 1977–1978, but below average in 1976–1977 and especially unfavourable in 1978–1979. In addition to taking a risk with the environment the agricultural authorities took the precaution of seeking advice from a group of agriculturalists familar with dry conditions and associated poor soils. A team of Western Australian farm managers, technicians and research staff has been participating in the management of the cereal schemes since 1973. This group has brought a philosophy with accommodates the poor wheat yields of low rainfall years, and makes provision for the build up of soil fertility and supplementary production by the introduction of a legume into the rotation. The legume is *medicago*[4] an annual legume native to Libya which grows well in alkaline soils in low rainfall areas. Commercial cultivars have been developed in Australia from Mediterranean collections and these were growing successfully in the Gefara area (Allen and Ewing, 1978, p. 1). By including this well-adapted legume into the rotation, together with appropriate fertilizer applications, cereal yields should continue to improve. In the years when the cereal crop fails it can be let out for grazing and even in low rainfall years the *medic* pasture will provide grazing for livestock.

The main purpose of the experiments was to establish if cereal production could be achieved in marginal areas. Table 1 shows that production was useful in the

Table 1. Gefara Plain cereals 1973/74–1977/78: area, production and yield

	Wheat				
	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78
	Area (hectares)				
Al Hira	70	1,111	2,800	2,000	1,200
Diga	793	4,000	2,350	1,100	1,400
Abu Shaybah	3,500	6,499	5,925	5,628	3,200
Bir al Ghanem	973	2,000	4,850	3,800	3,450
Wadi Athel	4,500	6,145	12,066	7,000	6,400
Abu Ayshah	20	—	3,397	1,250	1,385
Ajaylat	800	4,000	4,425	3,600	3,296
Wadi el Hai	1,900	4,136	—	—	—
Nalut	—	480	—	—	—
Tarhunah	—	2,170	3,700	2,705	3,296
Al Qassabat	500	1,300	—	—	—
Khums-Sawfeggin	—	—	657	808	1,200
	(13,056)	(31,841)	(40,170)	(27,891)	(24,827)
	Production (tons)				
Al Hira	16	706	673	6	410
Diga	176	498	433	8	377
Abu Shaybah	129	1,686	1,303	607	2,000
Bir al Ghanem	37	465	1,166	—	229
Wadi Athel	45	1,093	3,393	—	400
Abu Ayshah	—	—	287	370	140
Ajaylat	22	476	1,068	—	677
Wadi el Hai	126	893	—	—	—
Nalut	—	137	—	—	—
Tarhunah	—	3	146	1	202
Al Qassabat	3	3	—	—	—
Khums Sawfeggin	—	—	11	—	—
	(553)	(5,960)	(8,480)	992)	(4,435)
	Yield per hectare (kg)				
Al Hira	225	635	240	3	342
Diga	22?	125	184	7	270
Abu Shaybah	37	260	220	108	625
Bir al Ghanem	38	232	240	—	66
Wadi Athel	10	178	281	—	63
Abu Ayshah	—	—	84	297	101
Ajaylat	27	119	241	—	205
Wadi el Hai	66	216	—	—	—
Nalut	—	285	—	—	—
Tarhunah	—	154	396	3	77
Al Qassabat	65	24	—	—	—
Khums-Sawfeggin	—	—	161	—	—
	(42)	(187)	(211)	(36)	(179)
	Rainfall at Aziziyah (mean annual is 210 mm)				
October–May		255	435	198	224
October–February		245	245	165	189

Source: Ewing (1978) and Meterological Department, Tripoli.

years of above average rains, but very seriously deficient in 1976–1977 and was also poor in 1978–1979. Great scepticism was being expressed about the viability of Wadi Athel, Bir al Ghanem and Ajaylat, all lying in areas with mean annual rainfall below 175 mm. The other schemes are able to produce between 200 and 600 kg of wheat per hectare in good rainfall years, which though not a high yield showed the cereal scheme to be capable of producing approximately 5,000 tons of grain per year.

An important effect of the interest in *medicago* species has been the promotion of the idea that extensive areas of the Gefara with less than 200 mm but more than 150 mm could be sown with *medic* pastures. Such pastures

sensitivity of the natural resources, and especially the water resources to their casual management. The groundwater upon which irrigated farming depended was readily accessible to technology available at costs well within the competence of most individual farmers. Very soon the rate of withdrawal was far in excess of recharge, and accelerated as a result of the absence of regulation on withdrawal. It was a situation reinforced by the traditional approach to water use and by the wish of government to encourage the private sector as a balance to the otherwise inescapable inertia which oil revenues promote, leading to a public sector monopoly of all economic activity. Similar forces affected another natural resource, not dealt with in this paper, the semi-natural grazing resources. These resources too were severely degraded, in this case by the increase in stocking level which was far beyond the carrying capacity of the vulnerable Libyan rangelands (Gintzburger and Bayoumi, 1977).

The political changes of 1969 for a time brought a very untimely acceleration in the rate of resource utilization and virtually a full decade passed before the revolutionary government was able to escape the bondage of its own rhetoric; it cannot, however, escape the justifiable criticism that environmental realities were discarded by implementing policies which caused irreversible resource degradation rather than via a learning process which involved the rational weighing of predecessors' errors and the consideration of the available scientific evidence. The effect of the policies of the revolutionary government was to cause groundwater withdrawals to average four times the rate of recharge in the Gefara Plain as a whole by the mid-1970s, and in the areas of serious overpumping, such as at Bin Gashir, the rate of withdrawal was eight times recharge.

By 1980 the very difficult position of agriculture of coastal Libya had been recognized and the government turned its attention to the intractable problems of resource and institutional engineering required to rearrange land tenure and create viable farming units raising crops with water-conserving irrigation systems. Such changes will require a revolution in the perception of resources and a revolution in attitudes to water use and especially concerning its regulation at farm and regional level. The past three decades of experience in managing renewable natural resources in Libya has unfortunately induced a complex of confusion which has frequently emerged amongst those evaluating such resources in marginal semi-arid areas (Amiran and Wilson, 1973, p. 27). Renewable natural resources are extremely vulnerable to misuse, but it has been demonstrated that unconventional resource appraisal and innovative projects can lead to the viable long-term use of such resources (Amiran, 1978, p. 124). Libya's oil wealth should make possible innovation and economic have a useful carrying capacity (up to one ewe per hectare) and can be generated at less than 10 per cent of the sum required to establish perennial shrubs as envisaged in a number of parts of Libya (Allen and Ewing, 1978, p. 8; Halse, 1978, p. 6).

The al Marj Plain on the Jabal al Akhdar has attracted settlement and agricultural activity throughout history, but has never managed to live up to the promise of its apparently rich red soils and generally reliable rains. Rains are usually above 300 mm at al Marj itself, falling to 200 mm towards al Abyar. Some harvests have been remarkable, for example that of 1978 when both of the 20,000 ton silos at al Abyar and al Marj were filled or almost filled. The 1977–1978 season was one of rainfall, however, with 530 mm at al Marj instead of the average 340 mm.

Experiments similar to those in the Gefara are being conducted on the al Marj Plain to improve soil fertility through *medic* rotations and phosphate applications. Evidence is being assembled that the above average yield of 1·2 tons of wheat per hectare for the region achieved in the good rainfall year in 1977–1978 should be possible regularly. With attentive management of sowing it might be possible to move output to over 2 tons per hectare. Sustained production at this level will only be possible if soil fertility is sustained, and care should be taken in applying gross incentives such as the very high grain price subsidy (Libyan Dinars 150 per ton for wheat in 1978), which will promote increases of production possibly at the expense of the soil resources. However, outputs of grain of 50,000 tons per year are achievable from the farms on the Jabal al Akhdar which was about 5 per cent of the Libyan annual grain requirement in 1980.

Resource Realities and Political Fantasy

The foregoing discussion of Libya's past thirty years of agricultural development experience is particularly interesting in that first the economic and then the political circumstances of the country changed. The three decades, the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s can be contrasted; with the 1951–1961 period being one of economic and political dependence on the Western powers; the 1960s were years of increasing economic independence but Libya was still in those years under the shadow of Western oil and strategic interests, finally after the revolution in 1969, Libya took advantage of its economic strength and gained the will to be economically and politically assertive.

The renewable natural resource base was profoundly affected by the changes in the economic circumstances after oil revenues began to be significant in the early 1960s. The reason that the impact of the new economic circumstances was so great was not the scale of the burgeoning investment resources of the 1960s, but the

risks not feasible for those with more limited capital resources. But Libya's planners should escape from the notion that the country should become green like countries in humid latitudes, and assess agricultural development projects primarily in terms of their returns to water.

Acknowledgments

I should like to thank the Society for Libyan Studies for providing the expenses for the visit to Libya which enabled me to observe the developments described here. I am also indebted to staff of the Secretariat of Land Reclamation and Settlement, the Director of the Gefara Cereals Project and the Western Australian staff led by Mr. Mike Ewing; the Director of the Jabal al Akhdar Authority, Mr. Bashir Jodah and his South Australian advisers led by Mr. Bert Ninnes. In the Secretariat of Dams and Water Resources I was grateful for the help of the Director Mr. Taher Bufila and his staff especially Mr. Fituri Degais and Associated UN staff Dr. Phillippe Pallas and Mr. H. Floegel. For secretarial and cartographic assistance I am indebted to staff of the School of Oriental and African Studies.

NOTES

[1] Agricultural resources in this discussion include soil, water, labour (including skilled management), capital for investment in land improvement, in water resource management, and for recurring inputs as well as for the rural infrastructure of communications, local services and marketing.

[2] The coastal strip varies in width from less than a kilometre to over 20 km at Tripoli. Further to the east it is discontinuous, widens again between al Khums and Misratah. Around the Gulf of Surt agriculture is virtually absent. Farming occurs in the coastal plain of Benghazi and on the hills of the Jabal al Akhdar. To the east of these uplands there is scarcely any potential for agriculture because of low rainfall and poor quality water resources.

[3] The 1969–1974 plan was aborted as a result of the revolution. It does, however, reveal the thinking of the government in power before the revolution, in that only 12 per cent of the development budget was to go to agriculture. This proportion was very close to the level actually spent in the 1964–1969 period, a level which had nevertheless because of the manner of the spending seriously impaired the agricultural resources of the coastal strip.

[4] Clovers and *medics* have been found to be basic to the success of agriculture in dry environments such as Western and Southern Australia. The *success* of subterranean clover (*Trifolium subterraneum*) in Australia has little relevance for the mainly alkaline soils of the Mediterranean Basin, however, as it is adapted to high rainfall acid soils. The first *medicago* to attract attention was *Medicago truncatula* studied at the Waite Agricultural Research Institute in South Australia in 1939. The *medics* were introduced by accident into Australia, and they have subsequently been reintroduced into Libya. The species which have recently been brought to Libya include *Barrel Medic* (*Medicago truncatula*), *Strand Medic* (*Medicago littoralis*) and *Gama Medic* (*Medicago rugosa*). *Medics* thrive on alkali soils and as they are leguminous through their root nodules which contain bacteria (*Rhizobia* spp.) they can use nitrogen which is returned to the soil through the decay of plant residues or via grazing animals. In favourable conditions an average *medic* stand can increase soil nitrogen by at least 60–70 kg/ha in one season (Webber *et al.*, 1976, p. 28; Halse, 1978, p. 9).

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FORMATION, FUNCTIONING OF MOROCCAN STATE; RELATED DEVELOPMENTAL TOPICS

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[Text]

THE KABYLIAS



The peculiar position of Kabylia within the Algerian state and the particular role which the Kabyles have played in Algerian politics, both in the nationalist movement and since Independence, have never been subject to

serious analysis. The weight of nationalist ideology, the sensitivity of the question itself and superabundance of other preoccupations have combined to inhibit candid discussion and scientific investigation of the matter. As a result, the upheaval of last spring, the wave of demonstrations and strikes which spread throughout Greater Kabylia and as far afield as Algiers, Setif and Paris, took most observers as well as the Algerian government entirely by surprise. It had been widely assumed that the rebellion led by Hocine Ait Ahmed under the banner of the *Front des Forces Socialistes* (F.F.S.) in 1963 had been the swan-song of Kabyle particularism and that, but for a handful of disgruntled exiles and intellectual émigrés, 'the political problem had been settled'. In fact, however, Ait Ahmed's revolt was the swan-song of the Kabyle *maquis*, nothing more. Since then, the political problem of Kabylia has acquired an entirely new social basis, with profound implications for the Algerian state. Signs of this change were already visible as long ago as 1974, when a minor but explicitly 'Berberist' riot took place at Larbaa n'Ait Irathen in central Kabylia, and were unmistakable in the major demonstration which occurred during the football cup final in Algiers in the summer of 1977. In the light of the 'Tizi Ouzou Spring' of 1980, the question can no longer be evaded. But is it a *Kabyle* question?

The Problem of Definition

Many of the students in Tizi Ouzou and Algiers insisted that it was Berber language and culture in general which was at stake[1] and that this therefore concerned the Berber-speaking populations of the Mzab, the Chenoua and, of course, the Aures every bit as much as the Kabyles. In this perspective, there was no reason to stop at the Algerian frontier and the Berbers of Morocco were also brought into the act, at least by proxy.[2] Other demonstrators, by contrast, declared that it was the government's Arabization policy which was at issue and that, therefore, their movement represented the vast majority of Arabic-speaking Algerians as well, in so far as the colloquial Arabic spoken in Algeria is discriminated against no less than Berber by the official imposition of the literary Arabic of the Middle East.[3] Yet others went even further, insisting that it was not simply official cultural policy which was in question but the very form of government itself and that the crux of their position was the demand for an end to dictatorship and the establishment of a pluralist political system and all the democratic freedoms.[4]

It is important to distinguish these three perspectives, although the demonstrators rarely did so, for they have very different implications. The third one evidently subsumes the other two but neither the first nor the second necessarily imply the third. Indeed, the first position is not even opposed to the Arabization policy in principle, but merely seeks official recognition of Berber as a

second national language alongside Arabic. They have two features in common, however: none of these positions is explicitly anti-socialist[5] and they all express a reluctance to define the movement in terms of specifically—let alone exclusively—Kabyle interests.

The bulk of French media coverage directly reflected the movement's own somewhat confused self-image and substantially endorsed its various demands. The Algerian government, on the other hand, initially depicted the unrest as the product of 'reactionary elements linked to Imperialism'[6] and its predominantly negative and intermittently harsh response to the demonstrators got a thoroughly bad press abroad. But even if we allow that early official reactions were well wide of the mark and that an alternative course was open to the Chadli regime in its handling of the affair, are we justified in taking the demonstrators' claims at face value? For however far-reaching their programme and however broad the constituency in whose name they claimed to speak, there is no gainsaying the fact that the movement was confined to Kabylia and its urban outlets and mobilized the Kabyles alone. It fell on deaf ears elsewhere in Algeria.[7] Why is this?

There is undoubtedly widespread public dissatisfaction with the political system in Algeria but this still falls a long way short of posing a substantial democratic challenge to the regime: on the contrary, popular discontent has focused upon such matters as bureaucratic inertia and incompetence, arrogance and corruption—that is, upon the shortcomings of the system, rather than upon its constitutive principles. The demands which have generally been put forward have sought broader and more effective popular participation within the system, not its replacement by another. Dissatisfaction with the government's Arabization policy is also widespread across the country but, again, this expresses resistance not to the principle of the policy so much as to the dogmatic way in which it has been conceived and the inconsistent and insensitive way in which it has been applied. Such criticisms are thus positive rather than negative and, if heeded by the government, would enhance rather than jeopardize the policy's prospects of success.

Thus the fact that the demonstrators in Kabylia should have raised these wider questions, in effective isolation from the rest of the Algerian population, is to be explained in terms of the specific political conditions within which they were articulating their particular concerns. But how are we to characterize these latter? If neither the form of government nor the principle of the Arabization policy are, as yet, substantive issues at the level of national political life, is there a Berber question at this level?

As we have already seen, one tendency within the movement of last spring sought to define its content in these terms, and this was the definition most consistently

and thoroughly reflected in the headlines of the world's press. 'Paris-Alger: les Berbères sont dans la capitale' and 'Nouvelle manifestation berbère' proclaimed *Libération* on 8 and 9 April respectively, 'La culture berbère reprimée' and 'Les étudiants berbères manifestent à nouveau' echoed *La Croix* in its editions of 8–9 and 10 April, while *L'Aurore* spoke of 'L'irreductible fait berbère' on 10 April, a phrase repeated by *L'Express* in its edition of 26 April–5 May. On 12 April *Lutte Ouvrière* spoke of 'Les Berbères en lutte contre l'oppression culturelle' while a series of three articles in *Le Quotidien de Paris* on 17, 18 and 19 April was entitled 'La Revolte des Berbères'. *Le Nouvel Observateur* reported the 'Grève berbère' in its 21 April issue and ruminated upon 'Le Fait Berbère' the following week. Even *Le Monde* headed its *Bulletin de l'Etranger* column of 22 April with 'Alger et le problème berbère'. Nor was it only the French press which presented the affair in this way. 'Berber Riots Challenge Algerian Rulers' was the headline over the *International Herald Tribune's* report on 24 April while *Newsweek* advised its readers on 5 May that 'The Berbers' Pride Threatens a Nation'. There was, however, a curious dichotomy between these headlines and the articles which appeared beneath them: none of the latter were able to adduce the slightest evidence of unrest in any Berberophone region of Algeria other than Kabylia. The uninitiated spectator is thus confronted with a remarkable paradox: a social movement unequivocally limited to Kabylia (and those towns with substantial Kabyle populations) but which is defined by all and sundry in terms which ignore its regional specifity.

This is not only a matter of definition or presentation, moreover, It is also one of interpretation. Two explanations of the recent unrest have enjoyed wide currency. The first postulates a general conflict between the Berbers and their Arab—or, at any rate, *arabisant*—rulers.[8] The second, by no means inconsistent with the first, interprets this conflict as age-old, traditional: thus for *The Times*, the recent upheaval revealed that 'Algeria's Future (is) Threatened by its Past'.[9] In particular, in the Kabyle instance of this general conflict, the events of 1980 were widely regarded as a continuation, if not a mere repetition, of the F.F.S. rebellion of 1963.

Both of these views are mistaken. There is no general Berber question in Algeria, still less in the Maghreb as a whole. The Berbers may be regarded as a linguistic category or as an ethnic group, but neither label necessarily connotes 'community' and there is, in fact, no community of interest uniting the Berbers as such. The Berber populations of Algeria do not possess a common territory or a common economic life and there are numerous cultural and even linguistic differences between them. As a consequence of their geographical separation from one another and the absence of both any sustained commercial intercourse between them and of a written

language, there has been no tendency for their culture to become unified or for the language to become standardized in the course of their history. Indeed, contrary tendencies have been at work. Thus, while they may each be said to possess a distinctive Berber culture, this in not a unified culture. The oral tradition of Kabylia is separate from that of the Aures, for example, and the religious traditions of Kabylia and the Aures are entirely distinct from that of the Mzab and significantly different from each other as well.[10] And, while their respective cultures may be thought to stand in a common relationship to the official Arabo-Islamic culture of the modern nation-state, there is no reason to assume that the various Berber populations take the same view of this relationship. Entire populations do not develop an intense preoccupation with their particular culture for its own sake. More or less rootless intellectuals, in search of a role in life, may do so, but that is another matter. If the Kabyles *en masse* have become preoccupied with their own culture and have begun assiduously to cultivate their own peculiarities, this is because their present-day material interests have led them to do so. And there is no reason to assume that these material interests are shared by other Berber populations.

Thus, while we cannot speak of a Berber question in contemporary Algeria, there is a Kabyle question. This remains to be described and accounted for. But it should already be clear that there is little that is traditional about this question. The nature of the problem and its political expression are substantially novel and modern. In particular, it is not the parallel between 1963 and 1980 which is significant but the contrast.[11] If the movement which has developed in Kabylia describes itself as 'Berberist',[12] this reflects no more than the stake which the Kabyles have recently acquired in the status of their mother tongue and, apart from that, the understandable ambition of the movement's leaders to evoke support from the other Berber populations and thereby rebut the charge of 'regionalism'. For the time being, this ambition remains a forlorn hope, Neither among the Chaouia nor the Mozabites nor any of the other Berber populations of Algeria is a significant 'Berberist' movement discernible as yet. For 'Berberism' as it exists today does, in fact, articulate a peculiarly Kabyle interest.

The Present Form of the Kabyle Question

The crux of the Kabyle question as it presents itself today is the demand of the Kabyles for official recognition of the Berber language as the second national language of Algeria, on a par with Arabic, and the corollary of this demand, Kabyle opposition to the compulsory, nationwide Arabization of education and public administration. This opposition to compulsory Arabization is not a mere byproduct of the demand for official recog-

nition of Berber, however, for it predates this demand. Until recently, Kabyle opposition to Arabization expressed itself in support for the maintenance of French as the effective language of public life[13] and was therefore able to merge with the outlook of that section of the Arabophone middle class which had undergone French education and felt similarly threatened by the degallicization of the administrative and educational apparatuses. Gallophile opposition to Arabization transcended the Kabyle-Arab dichotomy but elicited only middle class support within the Kabyle community. Berberist opposition to Arabization is tending to isolate the Kabyles and to unite them.

Why should the Kabyles oppose Arabization? There is nowadays no reason in principle for Berbers *qua* Berbers to do so. When the Berbers of the Moroccan Rif rebelled in 1958, one of their demands was not that French should replace Arabic as the language of the local administration, but that Arabic should replace French.[14] The colonial administration of the Rif had functioned in Spanish. The incorporation of the Rif into a unified Morocco at Independence put an end to this state of affairs. The effective choice confronting the Rifians was between Arabic, with which they had long been familiar, and French, the official language of the colonial administration in the rest of Morocco, of which they knew nothing. Their material interests indicated a preference for Arabic, just as that of the Kabyles at the time of Algerian Independence indicated the precise opposite. The point is that these interests were the product of the specific histories of the populations in question. That both Rifians and Kabyles are Berbers was, at that time, neither here nor there. Similarly, there is no significant opposition to Arabization among the Chaouia Berbers of the Aures. The Kabyles have objected to Arabization because in the course of the colonial period French replaced Arabic as their second language as a consequence of the preferential access to French schooling which they enjoyed and, more important, the re-orientation of Kabyle migration away from the Arabophone interior of Algeria to the factories of France. French did did not replace Arabic as the second language of the other Berberophone populations of Algeria, although certain elements of these populations acquired it as a third language. Thus, while for the Chaouia, as for the Rifians in Morocco, Arabic may well constitute an appropriate and acceptable vehicle for cultural development, for the Kabyles it represents a most unattractive, because less modern, alternative to French and is increasingly regarded as a threat to the cultural development which they have already achieved and the opportunities for social and economic advancement which go with it.

In particular, the Arabization of public administration and of the educational system constitutes a major and direct threat to the interests of the Kabyle middle class.

The cultural development promoted by the colonial system produced a very substantial francophone intelligentsia in Kabylia which came to dominate the teaching profession across the country. In addition, the fact that public administration continued after 1962 to be conducted in French meant that Kabyles were able to secure totally disproportionate representation within the state apparatus and the institutions of the rapidly expanding public sector of the economy. Moreover, the commercial traditions of the Kabyles, which date from the pre-colonial period, had generated a sizeable capitalist class of Kabyle origin by 1962.[15] These traditions had enabled many Kabyles to prosper in the interstices of the colonial economy, retailing the products of French industry in many parts of the country, and to establish a strong position in the expanding tertiary sector (hotels, cafes, restaurants, and so forth), especially in Algiers, but this Kabyle bourgeoisie also began to develop an agrarian wing as Kabyle traders bought up estates abandoned by poorer *colons* in the course of the European exodus from the countryside to the coastal cities which got under way from the 1920s onwards. A manufacturing wing also appeared, although it remained confined to small-scale enterprises and light industry. Since Independence, private capital in Algeria has expanded in absolute terms but its range of activities has been progressively restricted. Its agrarian wing was prevented from expanding by the nationalization of European land holdings in 1962–1963, and largely eliminated during the '2nd Phase' of the Agrarian Revolution, the wholesalers of agricultural produce were put out of business (except on the black market) by the state take-over of agricultural marketing in 1974, the private retail trade has been subject throughout to government attempts to enforce price control and the once lucrative import–export business has recently come under sentence of death with the establishment of a state monopoly of foreign trade. Even the industrial fraction of private capital has cause for complaint: private entrepreneurs have tended to be very efficient in the light industrial sector, but there are legal restrictions on the scale of private enterprises and the recent introduction of the '*Statut du Travailleur*' (complementing, in its application to the private sector, the earlier reform of industrial relations in the state sector) constitutes a further limitation of the managerial prerogatives of Algerian entrepreneurs. Thus the expansion of the state sector and steadily increasing state control of the economy as a whole have relentlessly reduced the freedom of action of private capital. The most important area in which it has been free to develop has been the construction industry. But such dynamism as private enterprise has displayed in this sector has been intimately connected with the expansion of the state sector, for the state sector enterprises are the most important customers of private building firms, which

depend very largely upon public contracts for their business. All these developments, then, have combined to reduce the freedom of manoeuvre of private entrepreneurs in Algeria and to make [illegible] extremely dependent upon their representation in the state apparatus, for licences of various kinds, for supplies of raw materials and components and, above all, for contracts. And the Kabyle bourgeoisie, which has hitherto enjoyed unusually extensive representation within the administrative apparatus of the state, now faces the prospect of losing much of this indispensable representation as the Arabization policy begins to bite.

Thus the Arabization policy threatens all sections of the Kabyle middle class—the teachers and liberal professions,[16] the civil servants and officials and the traders, proprietors, entrepreneurs and salaried executives of the private sector. In contrast, there is no Chaouia middle class, much less a Chaouia bourgeoisie *stricto sensu*, to speak of. And, as one develops, the unshaken predominance of Arabic over French culture in the Sud-Constantinois and the Aures will mean that it will develop as an integral part of the middle class and bourgeoisie of the Constantinois as a whole and not substantially distinct from it, just as bourgeois elements from Lesser Kabylia (where Arabic influence was stronger and French cultural penetration weaker than in Greater Kabylia) used to be absorbed without difficulty into the bourgeoisies of Setif and Constantine during the colonial period.[17]

Kabyle opposition to Arabization is not a recent development but it has undergone three important changes in the last eighteen years. First, it is no longer confined to the middle classes as it was, arguably, in 1962. Family and wider kinship links still manage to transcend class divisions within Algerian society in general and within the Kabyle population in particular and the expansion of the state apparatus since Independence has given such networks a new lease of life as the single most important avenue of access to the administration, whence all things flow. Moreover, the substantial economic development which has occurred in Greater Kabylia since 1968 in the wake of the Special Development Programme for the region begun in that year has integrated the various districts of Greater Kabylia into an economic unit. Thus all Kabyles now have an interest in maintaining the Kabyle presence within the administrative apparatus of the state and, as the processes of economic integration have transcended the older parochial and tribal divisions, a common awareness of this interest and a unified political behaviour based upon it have been able to develop.[18]

Second, this opposition to Arabization has shifted its ground in the last decade, at least so far as the Kabyle intelligentsia is concerned, in that the advent of modern standard Arabic has weakened the pragmatic arguments in favour of the maintenance of French as the language

of public life. Kabyle intellectuals have therefore tended to concede the nationalist case for degallicization and to oppose compulsory Arabization on a new basis, that of the claim for equal status for Berber, which, they argue, is every bit as Algerian as Arabic and which is no longer an unwritten language and is thus capable of being taught in schools and employed in the conduct of administration.

Third, the fact that it is now the specifically Berber element of Kabyle culture which is being asserted in opposition to compulsory Arabization is enabling the movement to expand beyond the confines of Greater Kabylia and to incorporate the Berberophone region of Lesser Kabylia east of the Jurjura massif. During the colonial period, the Jurjura formed the boundary between the administrative subdivisions (*arrondissements*) of Tizi Ouzou, Bejaia and Aumale (now Sour el Ghozlane). In the course of the Revolution, the military command of *wilaya* III was initially based on Greater Kabylia but expanded southwards to incorporate the Kabyle population of the Bouira district and eastwards to incorporate the Kabyle population of the Bejaia, the Soummam valley, the Biban range and the Guer massif as far as the Oued Agrioun. For the first time in their history, the Berber-speakers of Kabylie were united under a single political and military leadership. At Independence, the new *wilaya* of Tizi Ouzou retained the Bouira district (and incorporated the largely Arabophone district of Lakhdaria—ex-Palestro—to the west) but the regions to the east of the Jurjura were included in the *wilaya* of Setif, together with the Arabophone part of Lesser Kabylia to the east of the Oued Agrioun. Because the *wilaya* administration functioned as the crucial agency of state-directed economic development at the local level, the Berber-speakers of Lesser Kabylia were brought into intense and essentially harmonious contact with their Arabophone neighbours within the *wilaya* of Setif, with Setif itself functioning as an effective melting pot for the two populations. The redrawing of the national administrative map in 1974 changed all that, however. The Berber-speaking population of Lesser Kabylia was excluded from the *wilaya* of Setif and given a *wilaya* of its own, with its capital at Bejaia. The drift towards the assimilation of the Berbers of Lesser Kabylia accordingly came to an end as the administrative and therefore economic reorientation of their region turned them back on themselves but also brought them into far closer contact with their neighbours in Greater Kabylia. Thus the political unity of the Kabyles from both sides of the Jurjura which enjoyed a brief existence during the war on the basis of their common interest in Algerian independence is now re-emerging, with the unwitting complicity of the national government, on the entirely new basis of their specific identity *qua* Kabyles and their common interest in the fate of their mother tongue. If the movement of last spring started in Tizi Ouzou and

spread first to the rest of Greater Kabylia and to Algiers, it also evoked vigorous support in the Soummam valley of Lesser Kabylia. There were riots at El Kseur and the Algerian national flag was publicly burned at Oued Amizour.[19]

It is these factors, then, which explain the rise of popular 'Berberism' in contemporary Kabylia, factors specific to the region and of recent origin. But popular 'Berberism' is only the present form which the Kabyle question has come to assume. The question itself remains to be defined.

The Nature of the Kabyle Question and its Evolution

From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, a profound process of national development got under way in Algeria. National society began to replace pre-national society in the countryside as the decay of tribal forms of social organization enabled private property to develop out of tribal-communal forms of property and private producers in various parts of the country to connect up with one another through their incorporation into the expanding national market. The Kabyle question has throughout been, and remains today, the question of how national society might develop in Kabylia and whether this society would be Algerian, French, Arabo-Islamic or Kabyle.

Prior to the colonial conquest, the preconditions of national development were already beginning to appear in Kabylia. In the central Jurjura, amongst the population known locally as the Igawawen, and in parts of Lesser Kabylia (notably the important Ait Abbes tribe), communal forms of ownership had already begun to give way to private property—*de facto* in the case of arable land, *de jure* in the case of other means of production—and the private production of craft manufactures for sale had developed to a degree without equal elsewhere in the North African countryside.[20] With these developments arose intense commercial intercourse between the Kabyles and the Arabic-speaking populations of the Algerian interior, and this intercourse was naturally accompanied by a process of cultural exchange. Arabic became the second language of the Kabyles while many features of Kabyle culture were assimilated by their neighbours to the south and east. Kabyle initiative and enterprise were widely admired, their architecture and settlement patterns were copied and, when a religious brotherhood, the *Rahmaniya*, developed out of the cult of a saint of the Jurjura, Sidi Mohamed Ben Abderrahmane, in the course of the nineteenth century, this rapidly expanded along the trade routes frequented by Kabyle merchants and pedlars[21] to achieve a dominant position in Eastern Algeria, as the scale of the 1871 revolt was to demonstrate.[22]

Had it not been for French colonialism, it is entirely possible that this process of development would have led to the emergence, in Kabylia, of a national society which

was specifically Algerian in culture and predominantly Arabic in language. But, while the advent of the colonial order undoubtedly accelerated the development of national society in Algeria as a whole, it impeded the further interpenetration of Kabyle culture and the Arabic-vehicled culture of the interior. Instead, the re-orientation of Kabyle emigration to France and the generalization of French throughout the region gave rise to the prospect of the development of French national society in Kabylia, that is, the assimilation of the Kabyles into the French national ensemble, This prospect also proved illusory in the long run, but it was by no means the mere hallucination of romantics. A very substantial element of contemporary Kabyle culture is of French origin.

The establishment at Independence of a regime emphatically committed to the promotion of an Arabo-Islamic national culture in Algeria initially led many observers and not a few Kabyles to expect that this culture would develop in Kabylia as elsewhere. But, despite the most assiduous efforts of the government, the continuing transformation of social and economic structures in Kabylia since 1962 has given rise to an entirely different outcome. National society as it has continued to develop in Kabylia has not assumed an Arabo-Islamic character. Indeed, in its attempts to induce it to do so, the regime has come to depend, for the recruitment of reliable local intermediaries, on the most backward features of Kabyle society—the *mrabtin* and the old *soff* political system[23]—and to inhibit political development out of these traditional structures. Such political development as has occurred has, for the most part, been 'Berberist' in content and this reflects the fact that the emerging national society in Kabylia has assumed neither a French nor an Arabo-Islamic but a specifically Kabyle character, which subsumes Berber, Arabic and French ingredients in a novel and unique synthesis. This synthesis is by no means complete, but it is already coherent enough to give rise to a specifically Kabyle collective interest and sentiment which can only be described as national in their form and extent and which are, in turn, strong enough to generate a specifically Kabyle political movement capable of mobilizing massive and vigorous popular support throughout the region and evoking the active solidarity of Kabyle communities further afield.

This movement is not nationalist, if by nationalist is meant either separatist or autonomist. Kabylia possesses no natural resources of significance and has long been dependent upon investments from outside the region. Since the discovery of oil in the Sahara, it has been clear that economic development in Kabylia hinges upon access to a share of Algeria's revenues through effective participation in the Algerian state. There is thus not the slightest basis for separatism in Kabylia.[24] Nor is political autonomy or self-government within the wider

Algerian state an issue in contemporary Kabylia. It was an issue in 1954, when, on the eve of the insurrection, the leader of the Kabyle *maquis*, Belkacem Krim, insisted that Kabylia should constitute a *wilaya* to itself within the nationwide structure of the F.L.N. Since Independence, the *wilaya* system of regional government has permitted the Kabyles a substantial measure of *de facto* control over their own local affairs, within the limits of a centrally planned economy and the one-party system. Every *wali* (Governor) of Greater Kabylia since 1962 has been a native of the region, moreover; the same cannot be said of any other *wilaya* in Algeria. But this is largely beside the point, for it is not the way in which Kabylia is governed which is at issue, but the participation of the Kabyles in Algerian cultural, economic and political life at the national level. Viewed in this context, the essential objectives of the Berberist movement can be seen to be entirely *assimilationist* in nature.

The Predicament of Berberist Assimilationism

The Berberist movement articulates the refusal of the Kabyles to be assimilated into the Algerian nation on terms judged desirable by the Algerian government and, simultaneously, their aspiration to be assimilated into the same Algerian nation on their own terms.

In the history of colonial Algeria, 'assimilationism' is the (arguably misleading) term used to denote the political tendency within the Muslim community which sought the integration of Algerian Muslims into the body politic of the French Republic. The assimilationists were violently attacked by the Islamic Reform movement of Cheikh Ben Badis and their failure to extract any significant reforms from the French government eventually led their most prominent leader, Ferhat Abbas, to espouse a separatist perspective from 1943 onwards. The failure of the assimilationists has encouraged subsequent observers to assume, with the questionable benefit of hindsight, that their project was doomed from the start on the grounds that it failed to recognize the distinct national identity of Algerian Muslims. This was the substance of Ben Badis's critique. But if their project was foredoomed, it was the peculiar nature of the European, rather than the Muslim, community in Algeria which constituted the serious obstacle to their programme.

Individuals of non-European origin have regularly managed to secure entry into the national community of metropolitan France. The concept of nation which developed in France in the course of the eighteenth century was a political, not a cultural or racial, concept. The nation was the political community, composed of free citizens of a democratic and secular republic. As such, it was not at all unreasonable to assume that neither the accident of Arab or Berber origin nor adherence to the Muslim faith need debar an Algerian from entry into this community. Such a view took no account

of that segment of the French nation which had developed in Algeria.

The French community in Algeria was constituted out of numerous elements of diverse origin and culture: Frenchmen from France, Alsatians, Corsicans, Spaniards, Italians and Maltese, to which were added, following the Cremieux decree of 1870, the indigenous Jewish population. What defined this heterogeneous population as French was not so much the fact of citizenship of the Republic, for their political life was substantially separate from that of the metropolis so that citizenship of the latter was a highly abstract matter, but, rather, the far more tangible fact that they were not Muslims. The concept of French nationality which mattered in Algeria was a cultural, religious and tacitly racial concept. The strategy of the Muslim assimilationists was, in essence, to invoke the intervention of (a somewhat idealized) metropolitan France to induce a change in outlook and behaviour on the part of the actually existing colonial France, a strategy which gave primacy to constitutional forms over social realities. But these same constitutional forms ensured that colonial France was both strongly represented in the metropolis and virtually autonomous of it when it chose to be. And the social realities meant that the colonial French would invariably ignore or defy Parisian liberalism when the very basis of their national identity was put in question, as it could not, logically, fail to be by the Muslim assimilationist movement.

All this is not entirely irrelevant to the Kabyle question. Kabyle assimilationists have been facing much the same problems as did Ferhat Abbas *et al.* An Arabist form of Kabyle assimilationism has existed since Independence but its efforts have been largely in vain. The Ben Bella and Boumediene governments promoted Kabyle Arabists to leading positions at local, regional and national level but they have enjoyed little or no following in Kabylia. Mohammedi Said[25] was a figure of fun fifteen years ago and the zealously Arabist *wali* of Tizi Ouzou from 1974 to 1979[26] was cordially detested by his fellow Kabyles. The Arabist variant of Kabyle assimilationism took no account of the peculiarities of contemporary Kabyle culture and got nowhere. The Berberist variant of Kabyle assimilationism takes these peculiarities as its point of departure and is now having to come to terms with the peculiarities of the larger whole within which it aspires to secure for the Kabyle community an accepted and acceptable place.

How can Berberist assimilationism come to terms with this larger whole? To put it the other way round, on what basis can the larger whole be expected to accommodate Kabyle particularism? This is a thorny question indeed and the Berberists themselves are divided into three main tendencies on the matter.

'Cultural Pluralism', 'Amazigh Revivalism' and 'Laisser-Faire'

All tendencies of the Berberist movement deny that Algerian society as a whole can be accurately described as 'Arabo-Islamic' in culture. But how, then, is it to be described? Before the events of last spring, the ruminations of the various Berberist *groupuscules* on this subject could be dismissed as of no significance. They are, perhaps, worth looking into now.

One tendency does, at least implicitly, accept that the culture of the majority of Algerians is substantially (as opposed to merely formally or potentially) 'Arabo-Islamic'. It is therefore led to postulate or assume the existence of two distinct 'communities' (the term 'nation' is carefully avoided) in Algeria,[27] although it prefers, for reasons we have discussed, to refer to the minority community as 'Berber' rather than 'Kabyle'. Its position is that the majority community should recognize the minority's 'right to be different'.[28] Accordingly, it is not opposed to the government's Arabization policy except in so far as this affects the minority community; it contents itself with demanding official recognition of the language and culture of the minority.

The main problem which this 'pluralist' perspective runs into is that of how a state which possesses a highly centralized socialist economy administered by a large bureaucracy can be run on the basis of cultural and linguistic pluralism. This would not matter, of course, if the Kabyles were a marginal group. But they are not a marginal group, unlike the other Berber populations in Algeria. They have played a fundamental and central part in the construction and manning of the state apparatus. There is no analogy with the Soviet Union, for example, where the state machine is unequivocally of Russian origin and cultural pluralism is essentially a matter of allowing a measure of cultural autonomy to the non-Russian nationalities at the periphery. A proposal which addresses itself to the problem is that made by Rachid Ali Yahia, who has suggested that senior government posts should alternate regularly between the two 'communities'. But this hardly resolves the issue. The question is not one of government or even senior administrative posts alone. It is the problem of how the administrative machine of a unitary (as opposed to a federal) socialist state can possibly function in more than one language.

Ali Yahia has been bitterly criticized by another group of Berberists, who see his solution as analogous to the system which operated in Lebanon before the civil war (and arguably led to the latter). This group, which calls itself '*L'Union du Peuple Amazigh*' and publishes a review entitled '*Assaghen/Lien*', rejects the very basis of the 'cultural-pluralist' position, namely the assumption that two distinct and coherent communities exist in present-day Algeria.[29] They insist, on the contrary, that there is only one community in Algeria and that this community is distinctively Algerian in culture. Moreover, they argue that neither French nor classical Arabic nor Islamic elements in this culture are native to *it*. The defining

characteristic of this culture is its ethnic specificity, its origin in a people descended from the autochthonous inhabitants of North Africa, namely the Berbers. Since 'Berber' is itself a foreign term, the term '*amazigh*' (plural: *imazighen*=literally: 'free man') is employed instead. Thus all Algerians are *Imazighen*[29] some *Imazighen* speak the old language (*tamazight*), the others speak a peculiarly Algerian dialect of Arabic which, so the argument goes, is not to be regarded as a derivative or hybrid or bastard form of classical Arabic, since classical Arabic is no more than the dialect of the Quraysh tribe of Mecca from which the Prophet came and the Arabs who settled in North Africa and brought their language with them were not of this tribe and spoke other dialects which have since evolved in their own, unique, fashion.[30]

Thus the project of the '*Amazigh* revivalists' amounts to an attempt to redefine the cultural identity of the Algerian nation in such a way as to render illegitimate the government's Arabization policy on nationalist grounds, in that it can be seen as involving the importation of a foreign language (Middle Eastern Arabic), and to secure for the Berbers (sc. Kabyles) a place of honour in the nation as being those Algerians who continue to speak the tongue of their ancestors.

The mundane problem of how the business of a modern state is to be conducted in *tamazight* or colloquial Arabic, let alone the combination of the two, has not, so far, been dealt with by this tendency. Moreover, the most prominent of the '*Amazigh* revivalist' groups, the *Union du Peuple Amazigh*, insists that *tifinagh*, the cuneiform script of the Tuareg, should be used for the purpose of writing in *tamazight* instead of the alphabet devised by French missionaries in Algeria[31] or the Arabic alphabet. This doctrinaire preference for a most unwieldy and antiquated alphabet on the sole grounds of its superior pedigree is evidence of the fundamental utopianism of this tendency which, as its publications admit, is almost entirely Kabyle in membership. There is little sign that Arabophone Algerians are prepared to mobilize alongside the '*Amazigh* revivalists' in defence of *their* mother tongue. It would appear, then, that this tendency is not seriously addressing itself to the larger whole within which the Kabyles are to be assimilated. It proposes a view of how the larger whole ought to conceive itself but does not deal with it in its own terms. The same could be said of the Algerian government, of course, with the crucial difference that the government has been building on foundations laid by the wartime F.L.N. (and by the *Parti du Peuple Algerien* and the *Association des Oulemas* before it) and has possessed the means with which to suggest its own conception of the national culture to the Algerian people in a most sustained and forceful way. '*Amazigh* revivalism', in contrast, faces an apparently unbridgeable gulf between ends and means in this respect. As such, it is to be regarded as expressive rather than instrumental. It is not a functional political position in

the real world.

The third tendency within the Berberist movement makes no attempt to describe or define the national culture of contemporary Algeria, still less does it propose to redefine or refashion it. Its essential demand is for the democratization of public life in Algeria. Its opposition to the government's language and cultural policy is just one facet of its opposition to monolithic *dirigisme* in general. Unlike the first tendency, the pluralism it advocates is political rather than merely cultural and, therefore, it need neither postulate nor deny the existence of two distinct 'communities' in Algeria, for the case for political pluralism and freedom of expression rests on a quite different set of assumptions, those of the classical European tradition of liberal-democratic thought, concerning the rights of individuals on the one hand and the good government of states on the other. Thus, with regard to the characterization of the Algerian national culture, this tendency is, by implication, fundamentally agnostic. With regard to the mode of development of this culture, its position is '*laisser-faire*'. It does not propose that the government abandon its current cultural policy for another, but that it abandon its claim to regulate this sphere of national life altogether. The implication of political democratization is that questions of language and culture cease to be an affair of state and that the evolution of the national culture should be determined by the free play of social forces, mediated, perhaps, by the state power but not directed by it.

To summarize: the first tendency opposes the cultural monolithism of the government with cultural pluralism, the second tendency opposes the modernist and universalist Jacobinism of the government with an atavistic and ethnocentric (and toothless) Jacobinism of its own and the third tendency opposes dictatorship in general with liberal democracy, and cultural *dirigisme* in particular with cultural *laisser-faire*.

Thus it is the third tendency which has the most radical position and the most coherent one. It can plausibly rebut the charge of 'regionalism' incurred by the first tendency and the charges of ethnocentrism and utopianism incurred by the second tendency. And there is a sense in which it can even rebut the charge of 'Berberism'. As yet, history affords no example of a socialist economy combined with a pluralist-democratic polity. Political liberalization, if followed through, would almost certainly lead to economic liberalization in Algeria before very long. Were this to happen, the Kabyle bourgeoisie would no longer be so dependent upon the extent of its representation within the administrative apparatus of the state. And, were the government to abandon its control over the cultural sphere, it is entirely possible that French would conserve its position as the effective language of public administration. In either eventuality, the Kabyle bourgeoisie would no

longer have a material interest in the status of its mother tongue. And there would no longer exist any substantial linguistic or cultural barrier to the integration of the Kabyle bourgeoisie into the Algerian national bourgeoisie as a whole.

There is a case, therefore, for distinguishing the third tendency from the other two on the grounds that its focus is political, not cultural. The two variants of Berberist assimilationism properly so called ('cultural pluralism' and '*Amazigh* revivalism') may be seen as responses to the heavy-handed Arabist assimilationism promoted by the government, responses which address themselves, not entirely successfully, to the arguments of the latter. The liberal-democratic tendency may be regarded as a variant of political assimilationism, in that the concept of the Algerian nation which it implicitly presupposes is a political rather than a cultural concept, the political community of all Algerian citizens, '*L'Algerie algerienne*', which is to be permitted to define itself in cultural terms as it evolves in the course of its history, instead of having a cultural definition imposed upon it in an arbitrary and *a priori* manner by its rulers at the moment of its birth. However, the variant of political assimilations which has emerged most forcefully in Kabylia is clearly bourgeois in its class content. The logic of its programme necessarily opposes it, in principle, to the socialist organization of the Algerian economy. Thus, if it avoids the charges which may be levelled at 'cultural pluralism' and '*Amazigh* revivalism', it faces a different and possibly more damaging indictment from the Algerian authorities.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has sought to identify the political implications and social content of the various tendencies within the movement which manifested itself in Kabylia last spring. It has done this in relatively abstract terms. In reality, these tendencies are yet to differentiate themselves clearly from one another organizationally or in practice. The movement of last spring was fairly incoherent in its postive proposals but effectively united by what it opposed.

It would be premature and imprudent to forecast how this movement will develop. But it would be even more imprudent to assume that it will not develop. The problems which it reflects have not been resolved. What the practical, as opposed to merely theoretical, implications of Kabyle dissidence are for the future of Algerian socialism remains to be assessed. In order to undertake such an assessment, it would be necessary to consider precisely why Kabyle dissidence has manifested itself at this point in Algeria's political history. This is a subject to which I intend to return in a future article.

NOTES

[1] *Le Monde*, 9 April 1980.
[2] Jean-Francois Mongibeaux: 'La Revolte des Berbères', *Le*

Quotidien de Paris, 17 April 1980.

[3] *Libération*, 11 April 1980.

[4] See the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the students of the University of Algiers on 9 April (reprinted in *Lien*, No. 7, May 1980); see also the text of the tract disseminated by the *Comité Anti-Repression de Tizi Ouzou* on 7 April in Algiers (reprinted in *Lien*, ibid.); see also *Le Monde*, 11 April 1980.

[5] Some of the demonstrators, particularly at Tizi Ouzou itself, emphatically declared their socialist beliefs and their general loyalty to the government on matters other than its cultural policy.

[6] See, for example, editorial articles such as 'Les Desseins Obscurs du Néo-Colonialisme', *El Moudjahid*, 16 April 1980, and 'Les Masques sont tombés', *El Moudjahid*, 23 April 1980, and especially the declaration of the *Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algérienne* (UNJA) (texts published in *El Moudjahid* 10 April 1980).

[7] Apart from purely hearsay reports, there was no evidence of unrest in the Aures. It is possible that the movement in Kabylia evoked a small echo from the students at the University Centre at Batna (the administrative capital of the Aures) but it certainly went no further than this. It should also be remembered that there is a significant Kabyle element in the population of Batna and the other towns of the Aures region (Khenchela, for instance). Unrest reported at Oran and Sidi Bel Abbes in western Algeria was certainly a function of the presence of substantial Kabyle communities in these two towns.

[8] See, for example, Abdelkader Rahmani, 'Le Coup de Sang des Berbères', *Eurafrique*, No. 296–297, 2 May 1980.

[9] 2 May 1980.

[10] The Mozabites belong to the Ibadite tendency of the Kharejite schism. The Aures region underwent the influence of the Reform movement (*islah*) led by Ben Badis and the *Association of the 'Ulama*, whereas Greater Kabylia was largely unaffected by this.

[11] As Jeanne Favret has pointed out, the question of the Berber language had nothing to do with the motivations of the F.F.S. (*Traditionalism through Ultramodernism*, in Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., *Arabs and Berbers* (London, Duckworth, 1972), pp. 307–324). I have presented an alternative interpretation of the F.F.S. revolt which, however, agrees with Favret on this particular point in my thesis, 'Political Development in Algeria: the region of Greater Kabylia' D.Phil., Oxford University, April 1980, chapter 5.

[12] Some of the demonstrators at Tizi Ouzou, it should be noted, expressed a reluctance to describe themselves in these terms, in view of their perjorative connotations.

[13] Favret, op. cit., p. 317.

[14] David Hart, 'The Tribe in Modern Morocco: Two Case Studies', in Gellner & Micaud, eds., op. cit., pp. 25–28), p. 47.

[15] For a fuller treatment of this question, see Roberts, 1980, op. cit., chapter 4.

[16] Kabyles have been prominent in the legal and medical professions as well as in education.

[17] For example, the prominent Lefgoun (El Feggoun) family of Constantine, which is from Ighil Ali in Lesser Kabylia by origin.

[18] What was really striking about the events of last spring is that the movement was by no means confined to students and intellectuals. The industrial workers at the major SONELEC plant near Tizi Ouzou and the SONITEX plant at Draa Ben Khedda gave active support to the demonstrators and all shops and service establishments closed during the General Strike on 16 April.

[19] Twenty-one people were given sentences of between one and five years imprisonment for their involvement in these disturbances (*El Moudjahid*, 22 April 1980).

[20] Roberts, 1980, op. cit., chapter 4.

[21] Roberts, op. cit., ibid.

[22] The military leader of the 1871 rebellion, El Moqrani, was a member of the *Rahmaniya* and it was when the *Cheikh* of the Brotherhood, El Haddad, proclaimed the *jihad* that the revolt became generalized.

[23] I have discussed the role of maraboutic lineages in 'The conversion of the Mrabtin in Kabylia', to be published in *Islam et Politique au Maghreb*, (C.N.R.S., Aix-en-Provence, 1981); for the manipulation of the *soff* system, see Roberts, 1980, op. cit., chapters 5 and 6.

[24] This is perhaps the place to emphasize that, contrary to widespread belief about the matter, the F.F.S. was in no sense a separa-

tist or secessionist movement. There has been no Kabyle separatism since the pre-colonial period.

[25] Commander of Wilaya III 1956–1957; conspicuously opposed to the F.F.S. revolt, he was included in both Ben Bella's Political Bureaux, and was charged with the supervision and promotion of the Arabization policy in 1964. An unusually pious but militarily incompetent guerrilla chief, Mohammedi was very much the 'token Kabyle' in the Ben Bella regime.

[26] A graduate of Baghdad University, Mohammed Cherif Kharroubi was appointed Minister of Education in President Chadli's first cabinet on relinquishing his Tizi Ouzou post in March 1979. This appointment was badly received in Kabylia, where Kharroubi was renowned for his refusal to speak in his mother tongue.

[27] See the tract dated 3 February 1979 published by the *Front Uni de l'Algérie Algérienne* (F.U.A.A.: an emigré opposition group led by Rachid Ali Yahia), cited in *Lien*, No. 2, April 1979.

[28] It is not only the F.U.A.A. which proclaims this right. There is a good deal of overlap and confusion in the political positions of the various Berberist sects.

[29] 'Pas de Liban en Algérie', article in *Lien*, No. 2, April 1979.

[30] Mbarek Redjala, 'Rémarques sur les problèmes linguistiques en Algérie', *Lien*, No. 2, April 1979, 49–63.

[31] This alphabet uses mostly Roman characters, except for certain Greek letters employed to convey consonants specific to the Berber language. It has been employed by Mouloud Mammeri in his various editions of Kabyle poetry.

CSO: 4500/70

EFFECT OF VARIOUS VARIABLES ON THE 1981-85 PLAN REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2748

[Text] Economic activity continues to be slowed down by unfavorable developments.

Recovery is expected with the effective take-off of the 1981-1985 plan

The Moroccan General Economic Federation (CGEM), at its general assembly 6 October, went through its traditional fall review of prevailing economic and social conditions. Those conditions show several signs which might augur a certain optimism. CGEM's president, Mr Mohamed Amor, went over them in an introductory presentation, on which CEDIES [Socio-Economic Research and Information Center?] has reported, before going in greater detail into activities in the major industrial sectors. An ambitious budget has been adopted this fiscal year, one which is essentially the first installment in the execution of the 1981-1985 5-year plan; and there was the promulgation of the real estate investment code; the slight increase in credit to the economy tolerated by the monetary authorities; and the new flexibility introduced into overall imports planning, as well as the elimination of the import deposit on certain goods.

Nevertheless, the Moroccan economy, already substantially affected by the consequences of the drought, has also suffered from the negative repercussions of the still crisis-striken international economic situation. President Amor said on that point that production of cereals had substantially declined, necessitating the importation of some 35 million hundredweight, which only added to the growing weight of oil product imports and weighed heavily on the trade deficit, which amounted to 5.2 billion dirhams (1 dirham = approximately Fr 1.05) for the first half of the year alone, or more than 72 percent of the deficit for the entire previous fiscal year.

On the domestic side, President Amor expressed concern about inflationary pressures, noting that the general index of the cost of living, which is an official publication, showed retail prices had increased 10 percent in the first 10 months of the year in Morocco as a whole, and 12 percent in Casablanca. This skyrocketing of the cost of living, he said, is inevitable under present domestic and external circumstances. In any case, it is not due to an excessive abundance of liquidity, since in monetary terms there has been no deviation from orthodox practice: The money supply grew by only 6.4 percent in the first half-year, while the volume of credits to the economy grew only 5.4 percent, compared to 5.8 percent for the same period of the previous year.

As for industrial and commercial activity, it seems that the current trend is one of stabilization, or even slowdown, if one can judge from the direction of a number of significant indicators such as: Industrial investment commitments made in the first 6 months, which are barely at the same level as the year before, about 730 million dirhams, compared to 694 million dirhams, most of it coming from the private sector; energy consumption, which also showed a decline, as seen in the 2.4 percent fall of industrial fuel sales at the end of June; and, finally, transactions on the Casablanca stock exchange, which declined 38 percent in the first 6 months.

Turning now to the different sectors of activity and the difficulties and problems encountered by businesses, CEDIES, analyzing the proceedings of the industrial leaders, says that the situation shows one dominant trend: Economic activity has been considerably affected by the decline in demand that has resulted, on the one hand, from the effects of the drought (declining purchasing power for a large part of the population), and on the other, from the delays in launching government projects, the government being the biggest customer in a large number of sectors.

It is the same for various branches of the metallurgical and electrical industries, for public works, and, to lesser degree, for the building trade, judging by commercial transactions on materials for use in those sectors, and for agricultural equipment. It is the same for automobile manufacturing and sales, cement and sugar consumption, the latter being particularly hard hit by the decline in activity of various food industries such as carbonated drinks. And while the fishing season proved a relatively good one, all things considered, the canneries are going to have to reduce their production because of the mediocre quality of the product, primarily the result of the obsolete equipment and a shortage of metallic containers, suppliers of the latter having been caught short. Other branches of activity, hiterto considered relatively immune have also suffered from the current circumstances. Such is the case with the pharmaceuticals, textiles, copper, paper and cardboard industries, among others, and to a lesser degree with transit storage.

In addition, the enterprises continue to face continuously increasing costs, increases which they cannot pass on because of official approval and price control, as well as critical cash flow problems primarily due to bureaucratic delays in [currency] exchange. The debate nevertheless disclosed several signs of recovery. This was particularly apparent in the metallurgical sector and the machinery and electrical branche, with the recent creation of the national engineering offices, which are going to bring more and more local industries into participation in big public and semi-public projects in the fields of sugar and phosphates.

9516
CSO: 4519/41

DARFUR AGRICULTURAL PROJECT TO INCLUDE SAUDI, BRITISH FINANCING

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1876, 23 Oct 81 p 2686

[Text] Among the large-scale Sudanese land development projects, the Western Savannah Project brings together two old projects undertaken in the Darfur region: the Savannah Development Project, undertaken in 1977 with joint IDA-Saudi Development Fund financing; and the South Darfur Rural Development project, undertaken with British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and Abu Dhabi Fund financing. Of the total cost of $21.5 million for the new project, the IDA will finance $12 million, the ODA $1.2 million, the Saudi Development Fund $4.4 million, and the Sudanese Government $3.9 million.

The most important of the actions undertaken within the framework of the two previously existing projects had been the creation of the Western Savannah Development Corporation, which will remain the prime contractor for the new project.

The long-term aim of the Western Savannah Project is to improve the economic potential of the west of the Sudan, stopping the erosion of natural resources and introducing new tenant farming methods. Water supply problems will be dealt with, in particular, by the restoration of numerous wells, abandoned either because they had run dry as the result of heavy use, or because they lacked pumping equipment.

The different sections of this project will be among the most important: $2.9 million for the purchase of water supply equipment; $2.7 million for the purchase of construction materials and equipment; $2 million for vehicle purchases; and $3 million for foreign consultant and training budget payments.

The British organization Huntings has been chosen as the consulting engineering firm for this vast project.

9434
CSO: 4519/46

BRIEFS

OLD SUAKIN PORT STUDY--The Italian company Bonifica has just delivered to the Sudanese authorities the feasibility study concerning the modernization of the old port of Suakin (Old Suakin). Modernized, this port will accommodate small-tonnage ships that trade only with the Red Sea; the capacity envisaged is 1.5 million tons per year. It should be recalled that the execution of the project, costing $50 million, is being financed in part by the EDF. At the same time, the development of a new port (New Suakin) is invisaged. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEANS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2618] [COPYRIGHT:. Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9434

CZECH COOPERATION ACCORD--A cooperation accord, reached between the Sudanese Ministry of Irrigation and the Czechoslovakian Hydrological Institute in the field of irrigation, provides, among others, for joint studies in this sector and for the training of Sudanese technicians. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1876, 23 Oct 81 p 2686] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9434

INTERNATIONAL CATERING FIRM--The group Albert Aboulela International has just opened an agency in Kartoum. This transnational group, which employs about 16,000 persons, has, for its major activities, the supplying of food to organizations such as hospitals, airports, large work sites, etc., management of hotels and camps, and food distribution. It is recalled, in Khartoum, that while it the present time there are no air catering companies in the Sudan, companies such as the French firm Peschaud supply companies carrying out large-scale works. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1876, 23 Oct 81 p 2686] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9434

PRESIDENTIAL PLANE FROM FRANCE--In accordance with a contract signed last August, the French company Dassault will provide the president of the Sudanese Republic with a Falcon 50 airplane, to be delivered at the end of 1982. The amount of the contract $11 million. [Text] [Paris MARCEES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1876, 23 Oct 81 p 2686] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9434

CSO: 4519/46

PORT EXPANSION AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH FRG

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1878, 6 Nov 81 p 2813

/Text/ Tunisia and the Federal Republic of Germany signed in Tunis, on 29 October, two loan agreements for a total of 53.3 million German marks /DM/ (about 11.7 million dinars).

According to the terms of the first agreement, the Reconstruction Credit Bank (KfW), a West German bank for development and reconstruction, will grant to the Bank of Economic Development of Tunisia (BDET) a DM 18.3 million loan (about 4 million dinars), guaranteed by the Tunisian state and intended to foster small and medium-size industries. The agreement was signed at the headquarters of the Directorate General of International Cooperation of the Tunisian Foreign Affairs Ministry by Habib Bourguiba Jr, president and director-general of the BDET; by Dr Brantner, member of the KfW board of directors and director general of that bank and by Ahmed Ban Arfa, head of the Directorate General of International Cooperation.

The second agreement involves a loan of DM 35 million (about 7.7 million dinars) to finance the expansion of the port of Mahdia (160 kms south of Tunis) and to improve the port's infrastuctures. It was signed by Ahmed Ben Arfa and Dr Brantner.

Minister of Information Tahar Belkhodja chaired a meeting held at the Cooperation Club of Mahdia which was attended by Dr Brantner and German Hauptmann, economic adviser of the FRG Embassy in Tunis, and by a large group of officials from the fishing and shipping sectors. During this meeting, the minister recalled that the expansion project for the port of Mahdia goes back to 5 years. This project will make it possible to triple the current capacity of the port. Work will start next March and will last 2 years.

The signature of the new loan agreements gave both partners an opportunity to extol the successful development and import of the financial and technical aid which the FRG has given to the development of Tunisia. Over the last 20 years, Tahar Belkhodja said, the FRG has contributed a total of 260 million dinars.

For his part Ahmed Ben Arfa reminded the audience that the financial agreements just signed were based on the governmental agreement endorsing the work of the last Tunisian-German Joint Commission which met in Tunis on 11 and 13 December 1980. A list of projects was submitted to the West Germans by representatives of the Ministry of Plan and Finance. Ben Arfa explained that these projects, with an estimated cost of DM 400 million (90 million dinars), included, among others, an

irrigation project for Ras-Jebel and Raf-Raf, a project to bring drinking water to rural areas in Central and South Sahel and a development project for the Siliana Valley.

We remind you that on 27 March this year we published an article reviewing relations between Tunisia and the FRG (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS No 1846, pp 830,831).

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VEGETABLE OIL PRODUCTION OUTLINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2747

[Text] Mr Abderrahmane Tlili, president and general manager of the Tunisian National Vegetable Oils Office, [ONH] was received at the palace in Carthage 22 October by President Bourguiba. He presented the president a report on vegetable oil production this year, and received guidelines from the president on measures to increase olive production.

In a press conference he held the same day at the ministry of agriculture, reported in the daily paper L'ACTION, Mr Tlili said that Tunisian olive oil production for the 1980-1981 season amounted to between 140,000 and 145,000 tons, clearly greater than the yield of the past two seasons (see MTM of 5 December 1980, p 3332). The ONH share, that is the tonnage collected by the Office, was 114,500-115,000 tons. During the same season, ONH gave advances on the order of 515 millimes per kilo to oil processors. The Office made export commitments amounting to 76,000 tons, of which 72,000 tons have already been commercialized and the remaining 4,000 tons is to be exported next month. Mr Abderrahmane Tlili also mentioned the fact that ONH had for the first time been able to honor its export commitments without resorting to the traditional middlemen, despite the problems the Office had with the European Community countries.

In addition, a price increase of 95 millimes per kilo was disbursed to all sellers in April.

The 1981-1982 season is not as promising as the season just past. In fact, overall production on the order of 100,000 tons is predicted. ONH will be responsible for marketing 80,000 tons. This decline in olive oil production is basically due to unfavorable climatic conditions; the dry season has lasted longer than "normal." Despite that situation, however, advances will be between 500 and 585 millimes, depending on the acidity of the oil. This, explained Mr Abderrahmane Tlili, implies that the level of exports coming out of the current season should be at least equal to last year's.

Regarding the talks with the country members of the European Community, the ONH president said a lasting solution, which takes into account the interests of both sides, would be found in 1982.

On another subject, contrary to the rumors being spread recently about a possible shortage of vegetable oils in Tunisia, ONH has a sufficient reserve stock to meet consumer demands for a 3-month period. Mr Tlili added that the rumors in question had no other purpose than to force distributors to stockpile their products. With that in mind, the Office has decided to make the new olive-oil canning process begun 18 months ago generally available. Thus the plant at Sousse will go into operation next March, or, at the latest, 1 June 1982, and will be capable of canning some 30,000 tons of olive oil, or 40 percent of consumption. In addition, the Jedaida plant will supply 10,000 tons of canned olive oil. The oil office is also planning on building another canning plant at Sfax.

On the question of whether Arab markets are the only outlet for Tunisian olive oil, Mr Abderrahmane Tlili said that those markets could absorb a portion of the nation's production, but that the solution to the problem would lie in the conquest of new markets, or in an increase in domestic consumption. Meanwhile, it would be preferable to find adequate solutions with the EEC. However, that may be, ONH has focused its efforts on the Jordanian and Syrian markets, which are traditionally large consumers of olive oil. Syria, for example, is going to import close to 6,000 tons of olive oil during the 1981-1982 season, while several years ago the volume of Tunisian vegetable oil exports to that country was virtually nil.

Olive oil accounts for between 10 and 20 percent of the oil sold in bulk to Tunisian consumers, and it is definitely not declining, said the ONH president. Quite the contrary, in some instances it is showing a tendency to increase, as was the case in 1974, a year during which the Office had problems marketing Tunisian production on the European markets. With the modernization of our installations, Mr Abderrahmane Tlili concluded, we will be able to export almost all of the nation's production in canned for bottled form.

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UNITED KINGDOM'S HEATH ADVISES WEST ON SAHARA CONFLICT

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[Article by Edward Heath: "Why We Must Intervene in This Desert War"]

[Text] The Middle East is not the only part of the Arab world where a territorial dispute has divided Arab states, endangered moderate leaders whose survival is important for the West, and fomented instability. There is another conflict where similar dangers are looming. It is the struggle between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, backed by Algeria, for sovereignty over the Western Sahara.

This vast expanse of desert, formerly known as the Spanish Sahara, borders the north-west coast of Africa and is rich in minerals, especially phosphate. It was partitioned and occupied by Morocco and Mauritania immediately after Spain formally withdrew its colonial administration from the territory in February 1976. From the outset the occupying powers were challenged by the POLISARIO a vigorous and highly astute guerrilla movement determined to win independence.

After a fierce struggle Mauritania finally withdrew from the war in 1978, following the overthrow of that country's leadership in a military coup. Morocco was then left to continue the war on her own.

Why should this little known conflict on the periphery of the Arab world be of any real concern to the West? There are at least three reasons why I believe the West should take a more constructive interest in its resolution.

First the position of King Hassan II of Morocco, who has long been a true friend of the West and a staunch supporter of Western policy in Africa and the Middle East, may be seriously threatened by the continuation of the conflict. The king has thrown all his prestige behind a massive war effort which shows no sign of producing a victory, which has resulted in the deaths of many hundreds, if not thousands, of his soldiers and which he himself declares is costing the country 800,000 pounds daily, or 40 per cent of the national budget.

Second, any unsettling effect which the war might have on the position of King Hassan could drastically alter the balance of power in the region in favour of radical leaders and are opposed to moderate Arab regimes and to the West. There can be no doubt that this would facilitate the fanatical purposes of President al-Qadhdhafi of Libya and endanger the already difficult position of the leaders of Sudan and Egypt.

The unnerving effect which these developments in turn would almost certainly have on the vital oil-producing nations of the Gulf could only do further damage to the security of the region and to the prospects of an Arab-Israeli settlement. The Arab world is now emotionally, politically and ideologically such a web that any radicalism or unrest can spread like wildfire and endanger the position of moderate leaders elsewhere.

Support From Moscow, Libya

Third, the longer the war continues and the more expensive it becomes for both sides, the more the POLISARIO may be forced to look to Libya and the Soviet Union for support. Indeed, it is already believed to receive considerable backing from these two countries.

It is a telling commentary on the short-term perspectives of our leaders in the West that few of them have ever acknowledged the potentially grave danger of failing to seek an urgent political solution in the Sahara. Once again they seem unprepared seriously to confront a looming threat to our interests.

Two alibis are often used to justify this inaction. The first holds that since King Hassan II's aim to control the entire Western Sahara would have to be abandoned in any negotiated solution to the conflict that now seems possible, a diplomatic approach would simply hasten the threat to his position we wish to avoid.

I cannot accept this argument. King Hassan is by all reliable accounts a popular leader in his own country. If a compromise with the POLISARIO could be found soon, he would be able to show his people a gain for their sacrifices--something which will become increasingly difficult the longer the war is allowed to drag on.

Since outright military victory for Morocco is almost inconceivable, the alternatives to a negotiated solution are likely to be worse. The dangers of the first of these alternatives--military defeat--need no elaboration. The second--a series of unilateral concessions by Morocco during the course of a continuing war--could be almost as serious. Such a strategy might hasten defeat for Morocco rather than postpone it because it will embolden the POLISARIO's forces rather than pacify them.

This indeed seems to have been the result of King Hassan' acceptance this summer of a referendum for the Saharawis on the future of the territory, for this implicitly conceded their distinctiveness as a people as well as being a clear response to their military effectiveness. Yet, the third alternative--in which the two sides are locked indefinitely in a position of stalemate--is hardly more encouraging. The demands in lives and resources which this would make of the Moroccan people will inevitably come to seem increasingly senseless to them, and as a result any eventual compromise which the king is able to strike with the POLISARIO will seem less and less of a reward the longer it is delayed.

The second alibi of the West for its failure to encourage an urgent and realistic political settlement is that to do so might irretrievably endanger our relations

with Morocco. It is true that a diplomatic initiative by the West might generate temporary strains in the relationship; but nobody has convincingly demonstrated that the common interests and values which bind Morocco and the West together are not sufficiently deep-rooted to prevail in the end and to assure the continuity of our close cooperative relationship. In my view, there is every reason to believe that they are.

Mediation and Source of Ideas

It would be impossible, and certainly undesirable, for the West to insist on any particular solution or path to a solution. But we can be of crucial importance as a mediator and as a source of ideas for a settlement.

Here, the EEC has a most important role to play. Both the new socialist government in France and the ruling Social Democratic Party in West Germany have good working relations with Algeria and a considerable amount of support for the POLISARIO within their ranks. In addition, the governments of France and Germany have a history of friendship with Morocco, to which they have extended a great deal of military and economic assistance.

Britain, too, has excellent relations with King Hassan. Taken together, this puts the European Community in a promising position for giving a lead in finding a diplomatic solution.

The United States, by contrast, does not have such a balanced relationship with the two sides. Nor are the POLISARIO, Algeria or Morocco as familiar with America as they are with the old colonial powers of Europe.

It is, however, a prerequisite to any mediatory role for Europe in the Saharan conflict that we should initiate a dialogue with the POLISARIO at the highest official level. There is no convincing argument against doing so, either on the grounds of constitutional principle or on the grounds of political expediency. Europe is, after all, busily courting the PLO; some of our most senior officials and political leaders have engaged in extensive talks with it, and we have insisted that the PLO should participate fully in the Middle East peace process.

To talk to the POLISARIO would /not/ [slantlines denote boldface as published] be to recognize the state over which it claims sovereignty, just as our dialogue with the PLO does not recognize its right to sovereignty over the territory which it claims on behalf of the Palestinians.

The incessant threat of turmoil in the Middle East should have alerted us to the profound danger of allowing conflict in vital regions to smoulder unchecked or of making ourselves irrelevant to their solution by a policy which eschews talks with one side or the other. History would surely judge us poorly if all the lessons which the Palestinian problem has so painfully taught us were now to be lost in the increasingly stormy sands of the Sahara.

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END